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 The purpose of this research project is to determine whether the implicit theory of 
integrity, a theory from the social psychology literature that predicts how social 
judgments and decisions are made, can explain internal auditors’ decisions. The implicit 
theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) states that there are two types of people: (1) entity 
theorists and (2) incremental theorists. Entity theorists form strong inferences from 
observed behavior that are used to predict future behavior. Incremental theorists, on the 
other hand, do not infer characteristics from behavior, and therefore, do not attempt to 
predict future behavior. In an internal auditing context, the implicit theory is applicable to 
an internal auditor’s assessment of management’s integrity. A quasi-experiment was used 
to assess the main effect of integrity cues (three levels of integrity between subjects) on 
an internal auditors’ assessed risk of management fraud based on a hypothetical case. The 
auditors’ implicit theory of integrity (interacted with the integrity cue) is also 
investigated. These tests offer some evidence in support of the main effect of the integrity 
cue on the fraud risk assessment, but no evidence is found in support of the interaction 
effect of the implicit theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of the research project is to determine whether a personal conviction 
of an internal auditor, specifically his/her implicit theory of integrity, can explain 
differences between judgments and decisions of internal auditors. “Judgments and 
decisions are made under uncertainty about the relationship between cues and events” 
(Libby 1981, 4). The implicit theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) is a theory from the 
social psychology literature that describes why different people (i.e., observers) construe 
different relationships between observed cues and events related to the behavior of those 
observed. The implicit theory states that there are two types of people categorized by how 
an individual’s underlying beliefs influence judgments: (1) entity theorists and (2) 
incremental theorists.  
 When considering a specific personal characteristic (e.g., intelligence, morality), 
entity theorists form strong inferences from observed behavior that is used to predict 
future behavior. An entity theorist believes the specific personal characteristic varies 
between people, but within a given person remains constant. For example, John holds an 
entity theory of integrity; that is, he believes that while one person may exhibit more or 
less integrity than another, an individual’s integrity is constant and does not change over 
time. Therefore, if John observes someone exhibiting low integrity, John will believe that 
person to be of low integrity, and will use that belief to predict that the person will act 
similarly in the future. 
 When considering the same personal characteristic, an incremental theorist does 
not form inferences and, therefore, will not make predictions about future behavior. An 
incremental theorist believes that the specific personal characteristic varies both between 
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people and within people. Using the same example, Jane holds an incremental theory of 
integrity; that is, she believes that the level of integrity displayed in a person’s actions is 
malleable and may change. Therefore, if Jane observes the same behavior observed by 
John, Jane will not form a belief about integrity of the observed person and will not 
attempt to predict how that person will act in the future.  
 Several hypotheses have been tested by researchers to determine how this implicit 
theory affects the judgments and decisions of people. McConnell (2001) studies how 
people form social impressions (like or dislike) based on observed behavior of people. 
McConnell’s conclusion is that entity theorists weight the cues they receive earlier more 
heavily than those received later, but incremental theorists do not. Therefore, entity 
theorists formed social impressions based on early observations. Gervey, Chiu, Hong, 
and Dweck (1999) investigated the impact of character-related traits on decision making 
as a function of implicit theory when determining guilt or innocence of a murder suspect. 
Entity theorists were more likely to use cues about the defendant’s respectability in 
determining guilt or innocence. When respectability was low (high), a higher (lower) 
percentage of entity theorists concluded guilt than when respectability was high (low); 
incremental theorists were equally likely to conclude guilt regardless of respectability.  
 While McConnell (2001) demonstrated that the implicit theory has an impact on 
the social judgments people form, Gervey et al. (1999) offers evidence that people will 
use those judgment in a decision. In an internal auditing context, it is a common practice 
to assess the integrity of clients. That assessment is a potential factor in judgments and 
decisions about the strength of the control environment, the system of internal controls,  
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and the risk of errors and fraud. This project is concerned with internal auditors’ 
judgments of fraud risk. 
 Cressey (1953) developed the fraud triangle (see Figure 1), which indicates that 
three elements (motive, perceived opportunity, and a propensity to rationalize) must be 
present for fraud to occur. Motive and opportunities are characteristics of the 
environment, which have been studied by many researchers. For example, Apostolou, 
Hassell, and Webber (2000) used professionals to classify risk factors as to motive or 
opportunity. Also, Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998, 2001a, 2001b) conducted a 
between-subjects experiment to determine whether the presence of fraud risk factors 
affected internal auditors’ consideration of fraudulent financial reporting.  
 However, only two fraud studies have investigated the third point of Cressey’s 
(1953) triangle, the propensity to rationalize, which is a characteristic of the 
perpetrator(s) of fraud. According to Cressey (1950), the propensity to rationalize is a 
moral weakness and a hidden variable. Though hidden, auditors do make an assessment 
of this hidden variable when assessing the integrity of management (AICPA 1996, 2002). 
Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) asked auditors with fraud experience to 
classify fraud indicators as to their ability to identify opportunity, motive, and attitude (of 
the perpetrator) to commit fraud. Beaulieu (2001) investigated the effect of 
management’s integrity on audit risk, procedures, and fees.  
 The first question this research project addresses is whether auditors will use (i.e., 
give weight to) integrity cues in their assessment of management fraud risk (a main 
effect). Solomon and Shields (1995) examine twenty years of research in auditing 
judgment and decision-making processes, and they identified 21 studies that employ cue  
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 Perceived Opportunity 
 To Commit Fraud 
  
 Situation Pressure Personal Integrity 
  (Motivation) (Propensity to Rationalize) 
 
Adapted from Cressey (1953) 
Figure 1. The fraud triangle 
 
usage as a research method for policy capturing. These studies generally found the cues 
significant in their research model, and the cues were “found to be consistent with 
professional auditing standards” (Solomon and Shield 1995, 152).  As of December 
2002, a new Statement on Auditing Standard related to considering fraud in an audit 
guides the auditor to “identify events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to 
perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to 
justify a fraudulent action” (AICPA 2002, ¶31). These three distinguished categories 
correspond to the Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle (see Figure 1) and are listed in the 
standard’s appendix which contains examples of risk factors separated into the same three 
categories. Following the guidance of this standard, auditors should be seeking and 
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giving weight to information about “inappropriate values or ethical standards” (AICPA 
2002, ¶A.2) of their clients. 
 In addition to the main effect of the integrity cue on the auditors’ assessment of 
fraud risk, this study will also investigate whether the weight given to those cues is 
modulated by the implicit theory of integrity held by the auditor (an interaction effect). 
The implicit theory literature (e.g., McConnell 2001 and Gervey et al. 1999) suggests that 
the implicit theory has such an effect on social judgments and that those judgments have 
been used to affect decisions. The implicit theory is being added to this research model to 
determine if it holds in an auditing setting.  
 As suggested by Gervey et al. (1999), the implicit theory also has an effect on the 
types of additional information requested, with entity theorists requesting more personal 
information (i.e., a further investigation of the cues received) than incremental theorists 
request. This study investigates whether the auditors’ implicit theory of integrity affects 
the type of additional information sought by the auditor during the planning process of 
the audit. 
 To investigate these research questions, a quasi-experiment was conducted. The 
research instrument (which is described in detail in Chapter 3) contains three main 
sections: (1) assessment of the subjects’ implicit theory of integrity using methods from 
prior research (e.g., McConnell 2001, Gervey et al. 1999), (2) presentation of a 
hypothetical narrative case followed by some audit planning tasks, and (3) collection of 
the subjects’ demographic information. The narrative case, in the form of an audit 
planning memorandum, presents the three elements of Cressey’s (1953) triangle: a 
motive to commit fraud, an opportunity to commit fraud, and a cue about the integrity of 
6 
the client. While the motive and opportunity are not manipulated in this case, there is a 
three-level manipulation of the integrity cue with only one level presented to each 
subject. 
 After reading the narrative, the subjects, internal auditors, were asked to make 
judgments about the likelihood of possible causes for a change in an analytic described in 
the case narrative. In this between-subjects design, the main effect of the integrity cue 
was investigated. Some evidence was found in support of client integrity affecting the 
auditors’ assessment of management fraud risk.  
 In addition, each auditor’s implicit theory of integrity was included as an 
interaction variable to determine whether it has a moderating effect on the auditor’s 
assessed risk of fraud, but no evidence was found to support such an effect. The implicit 
theory of integrity was also not found to have an affect on the types of additional 
information requested by the subjects. The findings of this study are in contrast to the 
evidence in support of an effect of the implicit theory on decisions in other literature 
(e.g., Gervey et al. 1999).  
 The remainder of this paper is organized in the following chapters. Chapter 2 is a 
review of literature related to the implicit theory and management fraud. Chapter 3 
describes the development of the research hypotheses tested and the development of the 
research instrument used to collect data. The tests of the hypotheses are described in 
Chapter 4, while the research conclusions and limitations are presented in Chapter 5. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This research project investigates how internal auditors use cues about the 
integrity of management in their assessment of the risk of management fraud. In addition, 
this study is designed to determine whether that assessment is affected by the internal 
auditors’ implicit theory of integrity (an interaction with the integrity cue). In this 
chapter, literature related to the implicit theory and auditor assessment of fraud is 
reviewed. 
2.1. The Implicit Theory 
 Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a generalizable implicit theory model that 
accounts for behavior patterns and the underlying motivations and goals of those 
behaviors. This model development began by examining behavior in children faced with 
learning (a task that improves knowledge) and performance (a task that proves existing 
knowledge). All children, when faced with a learning goal, showed persistence even 
when challenged. When faced with performance goals, children with low perceived self-
intelligence avoided challenge and sought tasks at their comfort level; children with high 
perceived self-intelligence persisted with challenges.  
 When given the opportunity to select a task (learning or performance), children 
who believed that their intelligence was fixed (whether high or low) sought performance 
tasks, while children who believed they had a potential to increase their intelligence 
sought learning goals. As a result, Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a specific model, 
the implicit theory of [self] intelligence, which states that people can be categorized into 
two groups with respect to beliefs about self-intelligence: (1) entity theorists who believe 
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their intelligence is fixed and seek only to prove what they already know; and (2) 
incremental theorists who believe their intelligence is malleable and seek to improve it. 
 In the second part of their paper, Dweck and Leggett (1988) modified the implicit 
theory model to generalize it beyond self-intelligence and beyond the self entirely. The 
general implicit theory model defines the same two types of people: (1) entity theorists 
and (2) incremental theorists. Entity theorists look at a personal characteristic (e.g., 
intelligence, morality) and believe the trait is fixed in people; that is, different people may 
have different levels (e.g., high morality, low morality), but within a specific person, the 
level does not change over time. Because of that belief, entity theorists form impressions 
about people based on observed behavior and will predict future behavior to be similar; in 
general, entity theorists adapt judgment goals characterized as being evaluative, rigid, and 
difficult to change.  
 Incremental theorists look at the same personal characteristic and believe it to be 
malleable within each person. Therefore, incremental theorists do not judge or predict 
future behavior; instead they adapt development goals characterized by empathy and 
persistence toward change. Dweck and Leggett (1988) state that whether a person is an 
entity or incremental theorist depends on the personal characteristic under consideration. 
For example, a person may be an entity theorist of morality, believing a person will act 
with the same observed level of morality in the future, but also be an incremental theorist 
of intelligence, believing people have the capacity to improve their intelligence.  
 This generalized theory has been employed by researchers in different contexts, 
many of which have used the theory to explain how one person perceives another. It is in 
this context that the implicit theory is applicable to internal auditing because a key 
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function of evaluating a system of internal controls is assessing the integrity of 
management. Two studies that test how the implicit theory affects perceptions of others 
are discussed below. 
 McConnell (2001) performed an experiment to investigate the relationship 
between the implicit theory and social judgments. The implicit theory of 50 
undergraduate psychology students was determined by asking their level of agreement 
with three statements about a person’s likelihood to change. Next, the subjects were 
presented with 36 observed behaviors (24 for a fictional person, Jim, and 12 for a 
fictional person, Bob; one-third of the behaviors were undesirable for each), the subjects 
(1) recalled as many behaviors of Jim and Bob as they could, (2) recalled the proportion 
of undesirable behavior given about each Jim and Bob, and (3) assessed the likeability of 
Jim and Bob. Entity theorists in this study were more likely than incremental theorists to 
recall more behaviors in general and more from the beginning of the list (on which their 
impressions were theoretically formed) than the end. Incremental theorist evaluated Jim 
more favorably because of the increased frequency of the statements about him as 
evidenced by assessing Jim as more likeable and attributing a greater proportion of 
undesirable behaviors to Bob. McConnell’s study shows that entity theorists weight the 
cues they receive earlier more heavily than those received later, but incremental theorists 
do not. However, in this research project, only one cue was given, not a series as in 
McConnell. 
 Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1999) investigated the impact of character-
related traits on decision making as a function of implicit theory in a legal setting. The 
transcript from a fictitious murder trial was given to 268 subjects (undergraduate 
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students) in three similar studies, who were asked to decide on a verdict of guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. Two experimental variables were manipulated in the 
transcript: (1) defendant’s respectability as indicated by clothing and reading preferences 
and (2) strength of the evidence against the defendant as indicated by the corroborating 
testimony (or lack thereof) by two prosecution witnesses. In the analysis, entity theorists1 
were more likely to use the defendant’s respectability in determining guilt or innocence. 
That is, when respectability was low (high), a higher (lower) percentage of entity 
theorists concluded guilt than when respectability was high (low); incremental theorists 
were equally likely to conclude guilt regardless of respectability. Gervey et al. concluded 
that "the implicit theories of moral character can set up a framework for making decisions 
about others” (Gervey et al. 1999, 27). The findings of Gervey et al. (1999) demonstrate 
how subjects react differently to one cue about respectability based on their implicit 
theory.  
 McConnell (2001) demonstrated that the implicit theory has an impact on the 
social judgments people form, and Gervey et al. (1999) offers evidence that people will 
use those judgment in a decision. Applying the implicit theory to an internal auditor’s 
assessment of management’s integrity may explain how internal auditors make very 
different judgments about managements’ propensity to rationalize fraud and, 
consequently, the auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk.  
2.2. Fraud Literature 
 Cressey (1953) developed the fraud triangle (see Figure 1), which indicates that 
three elements (motive, perceived opportunity, and a propensity to rationalize) must be 
11 
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Motive and opportunities are characteristics of the environment while the propensity to 
rationalize is a characteristic of the perpetrator(s) of fraud. According to Cressey (1950), 
the propensity to rationalize is a moral weakness and a hidden variable. Though hidden, 
auditors do make an assessment of this hidden variable when assessing the integrity of 
management (AICPA 1996, 2002). A presentation of accounting literature related to 
auditing and fraud is presented below. 
2.2.1. Professional Standards Related to Management Fraud 
 Fraudulent financial reporting has been the concern of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and professional accounting organizations since the mid-
1980s. As a result, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)2 was formed to 
sponsor The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, or the Treadway 
Commission (named after its chairman). In October 1987, the Treadway Commission 
issued a Report (Treadway 1987) describing its extensive review of actual fraud cases. In 
its Report, the Commission noted that management fraud usually occurs when an 
incentive and an opportunity coexist. To detect management fraud, an auditor must be 
aware of the influence of these incentives and opportunities. The Report also includes a 
nonexhaustive list of fraud risk factors (each classified as an incentive or opportunity) 
that can alert an auditor that fraud may exist.  
 Shortly after the formation of COSO, the IIA produced Statement on Internal 
Auditing Standards (SIAS) No. 3, entitled Deterrence, Detection, Investigation, and 
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Reporting of Fraud (IIA 1985). SIAS No. 3 addresses the necessary ability of internal 
auditors to detect indicators of fraud when present. When such indicators are identified, 
the Standard guides the internal auditor to perform additional audit procedures and to 
report findings of fraud to the appropriate level of management. 
 In response to the Treadway Commission Report, the AICPA issued SAS No. 53, 
entitled The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities 
(AICPA 1988a). SAS No. 53 specified that "[t]he auditor should assess the risk that 
errors and irregularities may cause the financial statement to contain a material 
misstatement. Based on that assessment, the auditor should design the audit to provide 
reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the 
financial statements" (AICPA 1988a, ¶.05). Prior to SAS No. 53, detection of 
irregularities (now known as fraud3) was not differentiated from detection of any material 
error. Implementation of SAS No. 53 did not change the auditor's responsibility with 
respect to detecting material irregularities; however, the auditor became responsible for 
assessing the risk of material errors and irregularities, considering specific risk factors 
listed in the Statement, and preparing an audit plan accordingly. 
 In December 1997, SAS No. 82, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA 1997), was issued to supersede SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988a) by 
clarifying the auditor’s detection and reporting responsibility by requiring that the auditor 
make a separate assessment of the possibility of fraud. When considering management 
fraud,4 SAS No. 82 requires auditors to consider 25 risk factors included in the text of the 
standard.  
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 In December 2002, a new Statement on Auditing Standard, numbered 99, was 
issued. The new statement, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (AICPA 2002), supersedes SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997). The new standard increases 
the auditor’s responsibility with regard to fraud audit procedures including extensive 
documentation of the audit team’s discussions of fraud, identified fraud risks, fraud-
related audit procedures and results, and communications about fraud and risks with the 
client and others. Notably, the new standard directs the auditor to “identify events or 
conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out 
the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action” (AICPA 2002, ¶31). 
These three distinguished categories correspond to the Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle 
(see Figure 1). Additionally, an appendix to the new standard contains examples of risk 
factors separated into the same three categories. In that appendix, the standard offers the 
following guidance to the auditor in identifying risk factors related to 
attitudes/rationalizations in management fraud risk: 
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, 
management, or employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify 
fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by 
the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence 
of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material 
misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting (AICPA 2002, 
¶A.2). 
Among those risk factor examples identified, “communication of inappropriate values or 
ethical standards” (AICPA 2002, ¶A.2) is listed. SAS No. 99 is guiding auditors to look 
at evidence of the values of the client, which is the subject of this research project. 
2.2.2. Academic Research Related to Management Fraud 
 Auditors make an assessment or judgment about the likelihood of management 
fraud. Academic research related to the judgment or decision-making process has been 
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conducted in many disciplines including studies about the judgment of auditors in a 
management fraud setting. This section contains a review of these studies organized by 
the decision-making framework provided by Libby and Lewis (1977).  
 Libby and Lewis (1997) describe decision making as a system of inputs (how 
information gets to the decision maker), processes (how the decision maker forms a 
judgment using personal characteristics and decision rules), and outputs (the quality of 
the judgment and the self-insight of the decision maker). Assuming the inputs would be 
the same for any auditor in a specific fraud assessment task, it is the process that is of 
importance when considering what leads to auditors making different assessments. 
According to Libby and Lewis, the process is influenced by two main factors: (1) the 
decision rule, the objective method used by the decision maker to complete the decision 
process, and (2) personal characteristics of the decision maker.  
2.2.2.1. Process Decision Rules and Inputs 
 In accounting research, particularly in research related to management fraud, 
studies have concentrated on cue usage in a linear form (regression) to determine the 
significance and weight of manipulated experimental variables, most of which are inputs 
(i.e., different circumstances). These experiments manipulate objective variables between 
subjects so the researchers can make a determination of how auditors’ decisions differ 
when circumstances are different. 
 Since SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988a) and SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) were 
implemented, academic researchers have been examining the use and effectiveness of the 
fraud risk factors. Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman (2000) give an extensive review 
of the body of fraud literature between 1981 and 2000. The review consists of over 30 
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fraud studies that investigated the validity and weighting of predictors of fraud, auditors’ 
unaided and mechanically aided fraud risk assessments, and how fraud detection 
influences audit plans. A general consensus of many of the studies in this review is that 
models (e.g., logit, expert system) developed in fraud research have outperformed the 
unaided auditor in detecting fraud,5 suggesting that audit firms should consider a 
modeling approach to fraud assessment. Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbleman suggest 
that the outperformance can be attributed to the complexity of the risk assessment task 
because “humans have difficulty achieving high accuracy when making complex 
decisions” (Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman 2000, 238).  
 Zimbleman (1997) examines the SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) requirement for 
auditors to separately assess management fraud risk and how it affects auditors’ attention 
to risk factors, planned audit hours, and types of audit tests planned. Two versions of a 
case were prepared with financial statements and narratives that presented either high- or 
low-risk fraud risk factors. Using software, the 108 subjects were shown one version of 
the narrative and were asked to do one of the following: (1) make one holistic assessment 
of risk; (2) make a separate assessment of risk of error, then risk of fraud; or (3) make a 
separate assessment of risk of fraud, then risk of error. Zimbleman found that auditors 
who had to make separate fraud- and error- risk assessments spent more time reading the 
fraud risk factors (cues) and budgeted more hours for both the high- and low-risk cases 
(i.e., there was no in hours difference between the high- and low-risk cases). Also, no 
effect was found regarding the type of audit tests planned.  
 Glover, Prawitt, Schultz, and Zimbleman (2003), a study conducted after SAS No. 
82 (AICPA 1997) was issued and implemented, replicated Zimbleman (1997), which was 
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conducted prior to the issuance of SAS No. 82, to determine if Zimbleman captured the 
full effect of the issuance of SAS No. 82. By comparing the pre-82 responses to the post-
82 responses, Glover et al. found that auditors with the high-risk case were more likely to 
increase the extent of audit tests than those with the low-risk case. Again, there was no 
evidence that auditors modify the type of the planned tests. Zimbleman demonstrates that 
as professional standards have become more directive about the specific responsibilities 
of auditors related to the investigation of fraud, auditors pay more attention to the cues 
that would point to fraud. Glover et al. further shows that the increased requirements and 
auditor attention have led to a change in how the audits are planned. 
 Apostolou, Hassell, Webber, and Sumners (2001) conducted a study that 
examined the decision rule or cue weighting used by auditors to evaluate the 25 risk 
factors identified in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997). A survey, which was sent to 140 
auditors (internal and external), consisted of 52 pairwise comparisons between the risk 
factors. The respondents rated one factor more important than the other or of equal 
importance. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to calculate a weight for 
each of the 25 factors revealing that the six factors categorized by SAS No. 82 as 
management characteristics accounted for 58.2% of the importance while industry 
conditions accounted for 14.4%, and operating and financial stability characteristics 
accounted for 27.4%.  
 There is no guidance in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) as to whether the presented 
risk factors indicate motive, opportunity, and/or rationalization. To provide this guidance, 
Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber (2000) surveyed 35 auditors thought to be experts in 
financial statement fraud because of their experience. The subjects, who were provided 
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by four of the Big 5 accounting firms in conjunction with support from the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, were given the 25 factors in random order and 
were asked to classify the factors as motive or opportunity (or unsure). They were not 
asked to classify a factor as rationalization because rationalization is a measure of the 
ethics of a person committing fraud according to Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber. The 
result of the survey was a classification of 13 risk factors as motivation, 11 as 
opportunity, with one not receiving a majority. Nineteen of the classifications were 
significant in a chi-square tests. All of the industry condition factors were classified as 
motive; all but one of the management characteristics factors was classified as 
opportunity. The operating and financial stability characteristics were split. The only 
factor receiving a unanimous classification was significant compensation tied to 
aggressive accounting practices, which was classified as a motivating factor. 
 Bedard and Graham (2002) investigated whether the orientation (positive or 
negative) of decision aids used during an audit has an effect on how the auditors assess 
risk and plan the audit. There were 46 auditors participating in this study, making 23 
pairs of auditors. Each pair came from the same firm and had worked on the same 
engagement. Each auditor was given an audit planning task on a client with which they 
were familiar, and pairs planned for the same client. Within each pair, one auditor 
received a negatively-worded decision aid (e.g., “function reveals a number of 
weaknesses” (Bedard and Graham 2002, 45)), and one received a positively-worded 
decision aid (e.g., “function is appropriately organized” (Bedard and Graham 2002, 45)). 
Using regression analysis, Bedard and Graham found that when using a negative decision  
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aid, auditors identified more risk factors and that the planning of substantive tests is more 
directly tied to the risks identified. 
 Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998) study the effects of inherent risk, 
control risk, and decision frame (structure of the auditing task) on how an internal auditor 
considers fraud. Their 2×2×2 design manipulated three variables in a hypothetical case 
given to 167 internal auditors: (1) inherent risk was high or low; (2) control risk was high 
or low; and (3) after a description of an unexpected increase in receivables, the auditing 
task was manipulated as either to investigate whether accounts receivable was fairly 
stated or materially misstated (decision frame). After reading the case, the subjects were 
given a list of 18 possible explanations for the unexpected fluctuation in receivables; 
three categories of explanations (six explanations each) were represented: (1) fraud, (2) 
error, (3) environmental. The subjects were asked to select six explanations from the list 
of 18 to investigate further in completion of their task. Analysis of the responses 
indicated that whether an internal auditor chose to pursue the fraudulent explanations was 
significantly affected by the levels of inherent risk and control risk, but not by decision 
frame. 
 In a similar study, Church, McMillan, and Schneider (2001a, 2001b) conducted a 
2×2×2 between-subjects experiment to determine what factors affected internal auditors’ 
consideration of fraudulent financial reporting. The 127 internal auditors in this 
experiment were given background on a company including one of eight scenarios 
involving analytical procedures, which were defined by permutations of (1) positive or 
negative unexpected income, (2) presence or absence of an income-based bonus plan, and 
(3) restrictive or nonrestrictive debt covenants. The respondents were asked to list up to 
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six explanations for the unexpected difference in income and to categorize each 
explanation as probably caused by economic factors, unintentional error, or fraud. 
Church, McMillan, and Schneider found that internal auditors were more likely to 
conclude (list as an explanation) fraud when unexpected income was positive; this effect 
was more pronounced when debt covenants were restrictive. No association was found 
regarding income-based bonuses. Church, McMillan, and Schneider also investigated 
association between conclusion of fraud and experience (tenure, both as an internal and 
an external auditor), but no association was found. Church, McMillan, and Schneider 
(1988, 2001a, 2001b) establish that auditors are more likely to conclude fraud when cues 
point toward motive and opportunity. However, these studies did not investigate the 
effect of client integrity on the likelihood to conclude fraud. 
 Beaulieu (2001) investigated the effect of management’s integrity on the four 
variables: (1) assessment of business risk, (2) assessment of combined risk, (3) extent of 
audit evidence recommended, and (4) audit fees recommended. Sixty-three Canadian 
audit partners read a narrative regarding a potential audit client in which integrity of 
management was manipulated by including (or not including) cues such as “the executive 
is not respected in the local business community” (Beaulieu 2001, 92). The response 
variables were measured on an 11-point scale where 10 (zero) indicated the variable 
would be much higher (lower) than that of a normal firm in the same industry. Using path 
analysis, Beaulieu concluded that integrity is inversely related to business risk and 
combined risk directly, and inversely related indirectly (through risk) to 
recommendations for audit evidence and audit fees. The studies discussed in this section 
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demonstrate examinations of inputs and/or decision rules used by auditors when making 
audit decisions related to fraud. 
2.2.2.2. Personal Characteristics of the Decision Maker (Auditor) 
 Many behavioral accounting studies have examined the personal characteristics of 
decision makers. Some recent studies concerning how personal characteristics of auditors 
affect audit judgments are briefly discussed. Church, McMillan, and Schneider (2001a, 
2001b) investigate the association between concluding fraud and auditor experience 
(tenure), both as an internal and an external auditor, but no association was found.  
 Beirstaker and Wright (2001) tested whether practical problem solving ability 
affects how an audit task is completed. Subjects (66 auditors and 78 students) were asked 
to solve two real-world problems (finding a mechanic and assessing the correctness of tax 
deductions) and two auditing tasks (evaluation a system of internal controls and 
performance analytical procedures). The results indicated that subjects with high practical 
problem solving ability (assessed by the degree to which the problem was identified and a 
complete solution described) were better able to complete the auditing tasks.  
 Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso (2000) investigate the effect of ethical cues and 
experience on auditors’ assessment of fraud risk. The subjects (80 audit managers and 80 
audit seniors) were given the research materials, which consisted of a set of accounts and 
a loan receivable containing errors. Half of the subjects received materials that also 
included a positive-ethics cue indicating that the company is taking risks related to the 
betterment of the community’s social and economic goals. In this 2×2 research design (2 
levels of experience; ethics cue or none), subjects were assigned randomly to one of the 
four cells. After reading the materials, the subjects assessed the likelihood of fraud risk 
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on a scale of one to 100. Using ANOVA, Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso found the 
following: (1) the presence of the ethical cue significantly decreased the fraud risk 
assessment by audit seniors (less experience), but not the fraud risk assessment by audit 
managers (more experience), and (2) fraud risk assessment by audit seniors is 
significantly lower than that of the audit manager when the ethics cue was present, but 
there was no significant difference when no ethics cue was present. In a related study, 
Owhoso (2002) used the same data presented by Abdolmohammadi and Owhoso to 
investigate the effect of auditors’ gender (interacted with the experience and the presence 
of a positive ethics cue) on the auditors’ assessment of fraud risk, but no gender effect 
was detected.  
 Chung and Monroe (2001) test the selectivity hypothesis in an auditing context. 
The selectivity hypothesis states that females are more likely to consider all cues in high-
complexity tasks and, therefore, make more accurate judgments as opposed to males who 
are more likely to consider only some of the cues. Participants (100 males and 58 
females) were asked to decide whether the balance in inventory was fairly presented 
based on a hypothetical narrative. Task complexity was considered high or low 
depending on the number of cues included in the narrative. The results supported the 
hypothesis by revealing a significant interaction between gender and task-complexity 
(low or high depending on the number of cues regarding the account balance of inventory 
in a narrative), the direction of which indicated that females made slightly more accurate 
judgments in high-complexity tasks.  
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2.2.3. Expanding the Management Fraud Literature 
 To expand professional literature, this research project will consider the auditor’s 
assessment of management’s integrity with respect to management fraud risk. When 
assessing fraud risk, the auditor must make a judgment about the existence of all three 
elements of Cressey’s (1953) triangle, but many academic studies have focused on 
motive and opportunity (e.g., Apostolou, Hassell, and Webber 2000) used professionals 
to classify risk factors as to motive or opportunity), and few academic studies have 
considered the third point integrity (e.g., Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) 
classified risk factors as to motive, opportunity, and attitude6). 
 When an auditor considers the likelihood of fraud, s/he cannot know for certain 
whether the three elements actually existed in concert. Therefore, the likelihood of fraud 
is not observable, so the auditor’s assessment or judgment of fraud risk is a function of 















 Assessment sAuditor' f , (2) 
where assessed propensity to rationalize is the auditor’s assessment of the integrity of 
management. Therefore, the process, as described by Libby and Lewis (1977), of how an 
auditor assesses the risk of fraud is an interaction between (1) the cues an auditor receives 
and (2) the auditor’s assessment of those cues. Because two auditors may make different 
assessments of the same cues, the fraud literature should benefit from understanding 
which personal characteristics affect auditor judgment.  
 Prior literature, as reviewed in Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbleman (2000), 
compared the known risk of fraud from actual cases to the auditor’s assessment of the 
risk of fraud, but has not considered how the auditor affects that assessment. This 
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proposed research will test the interaction between the (1) implicit theory of integrity 
held by an individual internal auditor with (2) the integrity cue given about the client to 
determine whether that interaction has significant effects on that auditor’s assessment of 
management fraud risk. Auditors will vary in their implicit theory of integrity (entity or 
incremental), and the integrity cues7 will be manipulated in the research instrument (three 
levels of integrity) resulting in a 2×3 design.  
2.3. End Notes
 
1 The method of determining a subject’s implicit theory is similar to the method used 
by McConnell (2001). 
2 COSO is a joint venture of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial Executives 
Institute (FEI), and Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National Association 
of Accountants (NAA) (COSO 2001).  
3 In the subsequent standard, SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), the word “irregularity” was 
replaced with “fraud.” 
4 SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) discusses both management fraud (financial statement 
fraud) and employee fraud (misappropriation of assets or defalcation). Though both 
are of importance in an audit setting, this study addresses management fraud only. 
Therefore, throughout the remainer of this proposal, the word “fraud” refers to 
management fraud. 
5 The auditors slightly outperformed the models in the nonfraud cases. 
6 Lobbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) present the formula P(MI) = f(C,M,A), 
which indicates that the probability of material irregularities (MI) is a function of (c) 
conditions or opportunities, (m) motives, and (A) attitude or ethical values of the 
perpetrator. 
7 To limit the potential for confounded variables, the motive to commit fraud and the 
opportunity to commit fraud will be held constant in this study; therefore, their effects 
cannot be measured. This study is limited to an investigation of the third point of the 
fraud triangle and how auditors’ assessments of this point may vary. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how the auditor’s determination of fraud 
risk differs due to personal characteristics. Specifically, does an auditor’s implicit theory 
of integrity effect his/her assessment of fraud risk?  
3.1. Hypothesis Development 
 During the planning and risk assessment phase of an audit, auditors consider 
many elements, including the internal control system and results of analytical procedures. 
As a function of understanding the internal control system, auditors must evaluate the 
control environment, which “defines the tone of an organization and the way it operates” 
and “foster[s] integrity and control consciousness” (Steinberg 1993). The control 
environment is also known as “soft controls” and includes management’s philosophy, 
integrity, and ethics. Auditing these soft controls is growing in importance because a lack 
of these types of controls “increases the possibility that other, more traditional controls, 
such as approvals and reconciliations, may be overridden” (Hubbard 2002).  
 Internal auditors gather evidence about soft controls in their organization through 
interviews and questionnaires. Therefore, this evidence is based on the auditor’s 
impressions formed about the reliability, truthfulness, and integrity of people, not 
transactions (i.e., subjective, not objective). Standards also explicitly require that these 
soft controls be evaluated. SAS No. 78, entitled Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No 55,8 
instructs auditors to consider such factors as the “integrity and ethical values,” 
“commitment to competence,” and “management’s philosophy and operating style” 
(AICPA 1996). In addition, SAS No. 99, entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
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Statement Audit, directs auditors to consider “attitudes/rationalizations to justify 
fraudulent action” (AICPA 2003, ¶31). The assessment of soft controls such as integrity 
of management is difficult to quantify, but an auditor’s assessment of soft controls is 
likely to impact the assessment of other risks that are often quantified (e.g., control risk, 
fraud risk). 
H1(alt): When assessing the risk of management fraud, internal auditors 
will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the client’s 
integrity. 
 Assessing integrity is not an objective procedure, but a subjective impression 
formed by interacting with the client’s management and witnessing their behavior. The 
impression formed is affected both by the actions of management and the auditor’s 
beliefs about human nature. In other words, two different auditors, after the same 
encounter with management, may form different impressions. The implicit theory 
(Dweck and Leggett 1988) demonstrates how impression formation is different between 
two different classifications of people: (1) entity theorists and (2) incremental theorists. 
In the extreme, entity theorists believe a personal characteristic is fixed (unchanging) in 
an individual and expect similar future behavior from that individual; incremental 
theorists believe the characteristic is malleable and do not form expectations about future 
behavior.  
 When assessing the control environment, internal auditors who hold an entity 
theory of integrity may be more likely than incremental theorists to form lasting 
impressions of management that they will use to predict or anticipate other actions by 
management. Applying this theory, it is predicted that when assessing the risk of fraud, 
entity theorists will rely more on the integrity cues of management than incremental 
theorists.  
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H2(alt): When assessing the risk of management fraud, internal auditors 
who demonstrate an entity theory of integrity will weight the 
moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those 
who demonstrate an incremental theory of integrity. 
 Auditors use many pieces of information when assessing the risk of fraud and 
completing other tasks during the planning process. As questions arise in an auditor’s 
mind, additional information relevant to making decisions can be obtained. Applying the 
implicit theory of integrity, entity theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to 
request additional information related to the character of management. 
H3(alt): Internal auditors who demonstrate an entity theory of integrity 
will be more likely than those who demonstrate an incremental 
theory of integrity to request character-related information about 
management. 
Table 1 summarizes the three hypotheses in both the alternative and null forms.  
3.2. Required Subjects 
 This research examines the effect of two independent variables and their 
interaction on an internal auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk: (1) integrity 
cues of management (high, medium, and low) and (2) the internal auditor’s implicit 
theory of integrity (entity versus incremental). The level of management’s integrity will 
be manipulated between subjects in an audit-scenario narrative, yielding three version of 
the research instrument. Each subject will receive one version of the narrative upon 
which to base answers, and responses will be compared between subjects. In addition, 
subjects will demonstrate their implicit theory of integrity as either entity or incremental. 
Therefore, this between-subjects, quasi-experiment has a 3×2 design resulting in six cells.  
 The power of a study is influenced by the sample size. When conducting an 
analysis of variance between cells (which is done later in this study), power is assessed 
by the number of observations per cell. Bratcher, Moran and Zimmer (1970) developed 
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Table 1. Research hypotheses 
 Alternative Hypotheses  Null Hypotheses 
H1 When assessing the risk of 
management fraud, internal auditors 
will assess the risk of fraud higher, 
the lower the client’s integrity. 
 Client’s integrity will not affect an 
internal auditor’s assessment of the 
risk of management fraud. 
H2 When assessing the risk of 
management fraud, internal auditors 
who demonstrate an entity theory of 
integrity will weight the moral 
inferences of the client’s integrity 
more heavily than those who 
demonstrate an incremental theory of 
integrity. 
 The implicit theory of integrity 
demonstrated by an internal auditor 
will not affect how that auditor 
weights the client’s integrity cues 
when assessing the risk of 
management fraud. 
H3 Internal auditors who demonstrate an 
entity theory of integrity will be more 
likely than those who demonstrate an 
incremental theory of integrity to 
request character-related information 
about management. 
 The implicit theory of integrity 
demonstrated by an internal auditor 
will not affect the type of additional 
information requested about 
management. 
 
tables for selecting the minimum sample size per cell needed to achieve a certain level of 
power. To use the tables, the following four inputs must be set or estimated: 
1. α, alpha-risk or the risk of incorrect rejection (of the null);  
2. β, beta-risk or the risk of incorrect acceptance, where power is 1–β;  
3. r, the number of cells in the analysis of variance; and  
4. ∆/σ, the ratio of the absolute value of the difference between the maximum and 
minimum cell means to the pooled standard deviation, where ∆ is set to define the 
smallest effect the test is designed to detect. 
Alpha was set at the traditional of 0.05, beta set at 0.20 (for a power of 0.80), and r for 
this study is six cells. Using the standard deviation from preliminary data, the ratio of ∆ 
to σ was approximately 1.25, which requires a sample size of at least 18 observations per 
cell to achieve a power of .80. 
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 By randomizing the three versions of the instrument, the subjects are randomly 
assigned into one of three cells defined by the integrity of management. However, 
implicit theory of integrity is a personal trait of the subject over which there is no 
experimental control. Therefore, data collection should continue until the minimum 
number of observations in the six cells is 18, which could significantly influence the 
sample size.9 
3.3. The Research Instrument and Variable Definitions 
 The internal auditors in this experiment were given the research instrument, which 
contained all instructions and forms necessary to participate in this experiment. The 
research instrument, which was available in paper and electronic format, contained three 
sections in which the subjects (1) answered questions to depict their personal implicit 
theory of integrity, (2) read a narrative about a company and their charge as an internal 
auditor at that company and completed fraud risk assessment tasks, and (3) provided 
demographic information. See Appendix A for one complete version of the research 
instrument. The tasks in the first two sections and the narrative are described in detail 
below, followed by a description of the randomization techniques used on the research 
instruments.  
3.3.1. Measuring Implicit Theory 
 To determine a subject’s implicit theory (whether they are entity or incremental 
theorists), prior research has used multiple statements to which the subject indicated their 
agreement or disagreement using a Likert-type scale (as seen in Gervey et al. 1999; Levy, 
Stroessner and Dweck 1998; and Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997). These three 
statements are listed in generic form below: 
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1. A person’s _____ is something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be 
changed much. 
2. Whether a person is _____ or not is deeply ingrained in his/her personality; it 
cannot be changed much. 
3. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s _____. 
The word or phrase that should fill the blanks depends on what implicit theory a 
researcher is testing. For example, if a researcher wanted to determine a subject’s implicit 
theory of intelligence, the first statements would read, “A person’s intelligence is 
something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be changed much.” 10  
 The subjects of this research project are internal auditors, who as professionals 
maintain their own integrity and who also assess the integrity of others. Therefore, the 
subject’s implicit theory of integrity is determined in this study. Incorporating the 
AICPA’s and IIA’s definition of integrity,11 the three statements that were used to 
determine each subject’s implicit theory of integrity are listed below: 
1. A person’s integrity is something very basic about him/her, and it cannot be 
changed much. 
2. Whether a person is honest and candid or not is deeply ingrained in his/her 
personality and cannot be changed much. 
3. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s integrity traits such as 
whether s/he is self-serving or law-abiding or has integrity, honesty, or diligence. 
Subjects were asked in Task 1 to agree or disagree with these statements on a six-point 
Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).12 Prior studies (e.g., McConnell 
2001; Gervey et al. 1999; Chiu et al. 1997) have embedded the three statements in a 
30 
series of similar questions so that the three statements of interest were obviously the 
focus of the research, thus avoiding pretest effects. In this experiment, these three 
statements were randomly included with seven other statements13 answered on the same 
scale.  
3.3.1.1. Implicit Theory Variables 
 To calculate a score for a subject’s implicit theory, each subject’s responses to the 
three statements of interest were averaged.14 This average score were used as an 
independent variable in two ways for each subject (as seen in Gervey et al. 1999). First, 
implicit theory was measured as a dichotomous, nominal variable. Subjects with an 
average score above 3.5 were considered to be entity theorists, their average score 
indicating that they agree with the three statements (integrity is pretty constant in a 
person). Subjects with an average score below 3.5 were considered to be incremental 
theorists, their average score indicating that they disagree with the three statements 
(integrity is a malleable trait in a person). This dichotomous variable (referred to as IT1) 
was used in statistical tests to represent the subjects’ implicit theory and was coded as 
one for entity theorists and zero for incremental theorists. 
 It is conceivable that the first measurement (dichotomous) does not completely 
capture a subject’s implicit theory. For example, an entity theorist with an average score 
of six (strongly agree) may make stronger moral inferences than an entity theorist with an 
average score of four (somewhat agree). For that reason, the average implicit theory score 
also was used as a continuous, ordinal measure (referred to as IT2). IT2 was constructed 
using the average response of the three statements. 
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3.3.2. Narrative Presentation 
 The second part of the research instrument includes a narrative for the subjects to 
read. The narrative establishes an internal auditing planning scenario for Chess Cab, a 
fictitious taxicab company, which is a division of a company called TransportNation, Inc. 
The narrative includes an excerpt from the audit-planning memo, which focuses attention 
to a change in analytics—a downward trend in taxicab maintenance costs relative to 
revenues. There was one experimental manipulation in the narrative: the integrity of 
Chess Cab’s Director, named Conaway, who stands to earn a bonus related to this 
maintenance-cost-to-sales ratio, will be depicted as either high, medium, or low. This 
manipulation results in three versions of the narrative presented to the subjects.  
 In each of the three versions, Conaway has been asked to resign from the fund-
raising committee of a children’s home. Descriptions of the manipulation of integrity are 
presented in Table 2. The entire narrative is presented in the research instrument shown 
in Appendix A, and the narrative text versions are presented in Appendix B.  
3.3.2.1. Integrity Variables 
 The variable CUE was used as an independent variable to account for the integrity 
cue given in each respondent’s version of the research instrument. This is a nominal 
variable coded one for high, zero for medium, and negative one (–1) for low. 
3.3.3. Assessments of the Risk of Fraud 
 After reading the narrative, auditors assessed the risk of fraud as an explanatory 
factor for the change in maintenance costs in two tasks: (1) feasibility of fraud and (2) the 
likelihood of fraud. Both tasks are discussed in detail below.  
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Table 2. Integrity manipulations 
CUE Integrity manipulationa 
Low 
Integrity 
Conaway is asked to resign because Conaway missed or was late to 
fund-raising meetings and because Conaway intentionally misled 
contributors to boost contributions. 
Medium 
Integrity 




Conaway is asked to resign because Conway told to truth resulting in 
the loss a contributor. 
a For exact text used in integrity manipulation, see Appendix B. 
 
3.3.3.1. Risk of Fraud—Feasibility 
 The narrative contains a graph representing a decline in maintenance expenses 
relative to sales. In Task 2A, subjects assessed the feasibility of seven explanations for 
the decline: 15 
• external factors, 
• internal factors from the Chess Cab division, 
• internal factors by TransportNation, 
• errors by the Chess Cab division, 
• errors by TransportNation, 
• intentional manipulation (fraud) by the Chess Cab division, 
• intentional manipulation (fraud) by TransportNation.  
(For the actual questions to which subjects responded, see Task 2A in Appendix A.) The 
subjects’ responses were made by marking one circle in a series of 51 unnumbered 
circles. Respondents were instructed that the farther to the right they make their mark, the 
more feasible they believe the factor to be.  
 Two measures of the dependent variable risk of fraud were taken from this task. 
Of the seven evaluations made during this task, two are related to fraud: one on the part 
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of Chess Cab (directed by Conaway) and one on the part of TransportNation. The 
integrity cue given is about Conaway. No cues about the integrity of any TransportNation 
personnel were given. The first measure of the risk of fraud (RF1) was be calculated by 
counting the circle marked when asked about the feasibility of intentional manipulation 
on the part of Chess Cab. RF1 was scaled using the following formula: 
50
1–xRF1 = , (3) 
where x is the circle marked counting from the left. RF1 will be between zero and one.  
 Because there is no information given about the integrity of the personnel of 
TransportNation, the assessed feasibility of fraud by TransportNation is not of interest to 
this study. However, the difference between the feasibility of fraud on the part of Chess 
Cab and on the part of TransportNation can be thought to be affected by the integrity cue 
given about the director of Chess Cab. Therefore, the second measure of the risk of fraud 
(RF2), was calculated as the difference in the circle marked for Chess and the circle 
marked for TransportNation, scaled between zero and one using formula (3). 
3.3.3.2. Risk of Fraud—Probability 
 In Task 2B, subjects assessed the probability that the decrease in relative 
maintenance costs is due to four factors: (1) external environment, (2) internal 
environment, (3) unintentional error, or (4) intentional manipulation. To complete this 
task, subjects were asked to distribute 100 points among the four categories, which 
should capture the subject’s opinion about the relative probability that each of four 
factors was the cause of the decrease in the maintenance-cost-to-sales ratio. The third 
measure of the dependent variable risk of fraud (RF3) is calculated as the proportion of 
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points (number divided by 100) assigned to intentional manipulation and falls between 
zero and one.  
3.3.4. Other Variables Measured 
3.3.4.1. Integrity Inference Manipulation Check 
 To measure the strength of the actual integrity inferences made by the subjects, 
they were asked in Task 2C to assess the degree to which they agree that the director 
possesses six character traits on a six-point, Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). The six traits are comprised of the following: four integrity traits (self-
serving, responsible, integrity, and candid) taken from the definitions of integrity in the 
AICPA Code of Profession Conduct (AICPA 2001) and the IIA Code of Ethics (IIA 
2001); and two distracter traits related to intelligence (unintelligent and well informed). 
 The responses from this exercise were coded from one (strongly disagree) to six 
(strongly agree). 16 The variable INFER1 is the score on the statement about integrity. 
The score of the four integrity traits were averaged to form the variable INFER2. 
Extreme scores for either inference variable represent stronger inferences.  
3.3.4.2. Additional Information 
 The narrative provided in this experimental setting contains all the information 
available. However, auditors are likely to want additional information. After the auditors 
made determinations of the risk of fraud using the information provided, they were given 
the opportunity in task 2D to list up to six additional pieces of information they would 
like to have to prepare an audit plan. Each piece of information was coded as to whether 
it is related to the character of the director. The variable CINFO is the number of 
character information requests divided by the total number of requests to create a 
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continuous variable between zero and one representing the proportion of character 
information requested. For example, if a respondent listed five additional pieces of 
information and two were related to character, the CINFO variable is scored as .4 (two 
divided by five). 
 Additionally, each piece of information requested was coded as to whether it is 
related to the bonus the director stands to receive. The variable BINFO is the number of 
character information requests divided by the total number of requests to create a 
continuous variable between zero and one, representing the proportion of bonus 
information requested. All variables measured are listed in Table 3. 
3.3.5. Randomizing Questions in the Research Instrument 
 Subjects either received a paper or electronic format of the research instrument. In 
every instrument, the tasks were presented in the same order: 
• 10 statements (three of interest) for assessing implicit theory (Task 1), 
• Seven questions (two of interest) about the feasibility of explanations for the 
change in analytic (Task 2A), 
• Four factors (one of interest) among which 100 points are distributed (Task 2B), 
and 
• Six statements (four of interest) about character traits (Task 2C). 
However, within each set of questions, the order of questions/statements is randomized 
along with the version of the narrative (high, medium, or low integrity). If the subject 
received the electronic version of the research instrument, movement from task to task 
was controlled by macros that also randomized the questions. Paper versions were printed 
individually so that the order of questions was randomized. The purpose of these  
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Table 3. Experimental variables 
Name Measures Description Source 
Panel A: Independent Variables 
IT1 Implicit 
theory 
A dichotomous variable coded as 1 for 





A continuous random variable between 1 
and 6 where lower (higher) values represent 
incremental (entity) theorists 
Task 1 
CUE Integrity As described in the narrative, coded as 1 for 
high, 0 for medium, and –1 for low integrity 
Instrument 
Version 
Panel B: Dependent Variables 
RF1 Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where 
higher values represent higher feasibility of 
fraud as a explanatory factor for a change in 
analytic; (x–1)÷50, where x is the xth circle 
of 51 marked for intentional manipulation 
Task 2A 
RF2 Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where 
higher values represent more feasibility that 
fraud was on the part of Chess Cab than 
TransportNation 
Task 2A 
RF3 Risk of fraud A random variable between 0 and 1 where 
higher values represent a greater probability 
of fraud as an explanatory factor for change 
in analytic; portion of 100 points assigned 





A continuous random variable between 0 
and 1, measured as the proportion of 





A continuous random variable between 0 
and 1, measured as the proportion of bonus-
related information requested 
Task 2D 
Panel C: Manipulation Check Variables 
INFER1 Integrity 
inference 
A continuous variable between 1 and 6, 
measured as the score representing the 
degree to which the director has integrity 
Task 2C 
INFER 2 Integrity 
characteristic 
inference 
A continuous variable between 1 and 6, 
measured as the average of four scores 
representing the degree to which the 




randomization techniques is to minimize or eliminate the order effects sometimes 
associated with questions. During the statistical analysis, tests were conducted to identify 
whether any order effects are present.17 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the 
variations in research instruments between subjects. 
3.4. Planned Statistical Tests of Hypotheses 
 In general, two main variables (independent variables), (1) the internal auditor’s 
implicit theory (IT1 or IT2) and (2) client integrity cue (CUE), are investigated to 
determine their effect on the risk of fraud (dependent variable RF1, RF2, or RF3) 
assessed by the internal auditor. Hypothesis 1 addresses the main effect of integrity on 
risk of fraud. Hypothesis 2 addresses the effect of the interaction of the two independent 
variables on the dependent variables. (No hypothesis is made regarding the main effect of 
the auditor’s implicit theory on risk of fraud.) 
 Hypothesis 3 tests the main effect of the internal auditor’s implicit theory on two 
other dependent variables related to information requested by the respondent. A 
discussion of the models and planned hypothesis tests for this research is given below. 
First however, the test of the manipulation check is discussed. 
3.4.1. Manipulation Check 
 The level of integrity of Chess Cab’s director is experimentally manipulated (see 
Table 2); the independent variable CUE is coded as one for high, zero for medium, and 
negative one (–1) for low to represent this manipulation. As a manipulation check, the 
respondents were asked to assess the director’s integrity. Respondent’s who received the 
high-integrity version of the instrument should have assessed the level of integrity higher 
than those who received the medium-integrity and low-integrity versions.  
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 The respondents’ impressions of client integrity were assessed directly on the 
research instrument in Task 2C by responses to the statement “Chris Conaway seems to 
have integrity.” The respondents marked one of six circles coded one through six, 
representing strongly disagree to strongly agree. The value one to six is assigned to 
variable INFER1. In addition, three other statements related to integrity traits are also 
presented in Task 2C: “Chris Conaway seems responsible,” “Chris Conaway seems 
candid,” and “Chris Conaway seems to be self-serving.” The first two of these three 
statements are also assigned a value of one to six based on the same response scale. The 
third is scored one to six and reversed by subtracting the score from seven because self-
serving is a negative trait contra to integrity. The variable INFER2 is an average of the 
response scores for the four integrity traits.18  
 To determine whether the manipulation affected the respondents’ assessments of 
the client’s integrity, four techniques were used. First, examining the correlation between 
cue (an ordinal variable) and both inference variable (INFER1 and INFER2) will 
determine the degree to which the manipulation and the respondents’ inferences move 
together. Second, a series of boxplots will depict the effect of manipulation graphically 
and identify variability an potential outliers within each level of the manipulation. 
 Third, one-way ANOVA tests using CUE as the independent (grouping) variable 
will identify the statistical significance of the manipulation on the respondents’ 
inferences (INFER1 and INFER2, in separate tests). Significance of the variable CUE 
will indicate that the manipulation had an effect on the respondents’ assessments of the 
client’s integrity; nonsignificant results will not support a successful manipulation of 
client’s integrity in the research instruments. 
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 The variable CUE may be significant, but that result does not imply that a cue 
intended to represent high integrity causes a higher value of the variables INFER1 or 
INFER2. Therefore, the final examination of the manipulation was a series of two-sample 
t-tests were used to determine whether the following directions hold: 
• INFER1CUE=H > INFER1CUE=L; 
• INFER1CUE=H > INFER1CUE=M; and 
• INFER1CUE=M > INFER1CUE=L. 
These tests were repeated for INFER2.  
 Because the manipulation of client integrity is the cornerstone of this research 
project, it is important that the manipulation is effective. If the manipulation is not 
effective, the remaining tests can be conducted using the inferred level of client integrity 
(INFER1 and INFER2) rather than the manipulation variable (CUE); however, 
interpretation of the results will be slightly different. 
3.4.2. Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1 tests the main effect of client integrity (CUE, independent variable) 
on assessed risk of fraud (dependent variable). Risk of fraud is measured in three ways in 
the research instrument. First in task 2A, seven questions (in random order) are asked 
about what could have feasibly caused the change in analytic shown in the narrative.19 
The first question of interest is the following: “How feasible is it that the decrease in 
maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of fraudulent activities on the part 
of Chris Conaway?” Conaway is the member of management about whom the integrity 
cue is given. The response is made by marking one of 51 unnumbered circles where the 
circles farther to the right indicate more feasibility. The first measure of risk of fraud 
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(RF1) is scaled between zero and one using the circle number (counting from left to 
right) marked (see formula 3). 
 Second, another question in task 2A, asks “How feasible is it that the decrease in 
maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of fraudulent activities on the part 
of Terry Alexander?” The response is made in the same way; however, no integrity cue is 
given about Alexander. The second measure of risk of fraud (RF2) is the difference 
between the response for Conaway and Alexander. 
 Third in task 2B, the respondents were asked to distribute 100 points between four 
explanatory factors to represent the likelihood that the change in analytic is a result of the 
factors, which are internal environment, external environment, intentional manipulation, 
and misstatement.20 The third measure of risk of fraud (RF3) is the portion of 100 points 
assigned to intentional manipulation (fraud). 
 To test hypothesis 1, four tests were conducted. First a MANOVA test was 
conducted to assess the effect of CUE on the matrix of the three dependent variables, 
RF1, RF2, and RF3. In addition, three ANOVA tests were conducted using the following 
model: 
 iji εαµ ++=ijRF , (4) 
where RFij represents the jth observed value of one of the three risk of fraud variables (i 
representing the level of CUE), µ represents the mean of all RFij responses, and αi 
represents the effect the the ith level of and CUE (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for 
low). Hypothesis 1 will be supported if CUE affects the means of the subsamples, and if 
as CUE increases, risk of fraud decreases. To test directionality individual t-tests will be 
conducted between the levels of CUE. 
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3.4.3. Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 tests the interaction effect of the client integrity (CUE, independent 
variable) and the respondents’ implicit theory of integrity (IT, independent variable) on 
assessed risk of fraud (RF, dependent variable). Implicit theory of integrity is measured 
in two ways using the response to three statements about a person’s integrity (see section 
3.3.1.1.). The first is a dichotomous variable coded as one for entity theorists and zero for 
incremental theorists. The second is a continuous variable between zero and one, where 
smaller values represent incremental theorists and larger values represent entity theorists. 
 To test Hypothesis 2, eight tests were conducted. The first four tests included a 
MANOVA and three ANOVA using the dichotomous measure of implicit theory (IT1). 
The model for these four tests is shown below: 
 ijkijjiijk εαββαµ ++++=RF , (5) 
where RFijk is the kth observed value  of one of the three risk of fraud variables (in the ith 
level of CUE and the jth level of IT),21 µ represents the mean of all RFijk responses, αi 
represents the effect the the ith level of and CUE (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for 
low), βj is the jth level of IT1 (1 for entity theorists and 0 for incremental theorists), and 
αβij is the interaction of these two variables. To support the second hypothesis, the 
interaction effect should be significant. 
 The remaining four tests of hypothesis 2 include a multivariate multiple 
regression, followed by three multiple regressions. The model for these regressions is 
shown below: 
 e+×+++= ITCUEITCUERF 3210 ββββ , (6) 
where RF represents one of the three risk of fraud variables or the matrix of RF responses 
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in the multivariate regression, CUE is the variable that represents the manipulated level 
of integrity (+1 for high, 0 for medium, and –1 for low), and IT represents one of the two 
implicit theory variables. By interacting the integrity cue and implicit theory variables, 
the value of β3 represents how extreme the risk of fraud assessments were by entity 
theorists as compared to incremental theorists. Hypothesis 2 will be supported if β3<0. 
Essentially, β3 represents the modification of β1 related to the respondents implicit 
theory. 
 There is no theory that supports the effect of the implicit theory on the assessed 
risk of fraud. Therefore no hypothesis is stated related to the main effect of implicit 
theory on the risk of fraud. Accordingly, no expectations are made and no statistical tests 
were conducted related to β2. 
3.4.4. Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 tests the effect of the respondent’s implicit theory of integrity (IT, 
independent variable) on the type of additional information requested by the respondent. 
If entity theorists do rely on character-related information more heavily than other types 
as theorized, it is expected that entity theorists will request character-related additional 
information significantly more than will incremental theorists. In task 2D, the 
respondents were given six blank spaces to request additional information before 
finalizing the audit program. The type of information requested is measured in two ways. 
Each piece of information requested is coded as being character-related (related to 
Conaway, the member of management about whom the integrity cue is given) or related 
to the bonus Conaway will receive for the reduction in the analytic described in the 
narrative. CINFO is the number of character-related pieces of information requested 
43 
divided by the total number of pieces of additional information requested. BINFO is the 
number of bonus-related information requested divided by the number of pieces of 
information requested. 
 To test hypothesis 3, two two-sample t-tests were performed comparing the 
average INFO score for entity theorists to the average INFO score of the incremental 
theorists, where INFO represents either CINFO or BINFO. Hypothesis 3 will be 
supported if INFOEntity>INFOIncremental, indicating that the entity theorists are requesting a 
larger portion of character- or bonus-related information. 
3.5. End Notes
 
8 SAS No. 78 (AICPA 1996) modifies SAS No. 55, entitled Consideration of Internal 
Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 1988b). Hereafter, the two 
Statements will be cited together as SAS No. 78. 
9 Test data (using accounting majors) indicates that entity theorists outnumber 
incremental theorists by a factor of two to one. Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 
(1999) used psychology majors and found a more even split between entity (47%) 
and incremental theorists (53%). A fairly even distribution is expected because 
internal auditors come from a wide variety of disciplines. 
10 Validation of this three-question measure of implicit theory was described in Levy, 
Stroessner, and Dweck (1998). The validation involved giving a large battery of 
questions which included each of the three questions two times: (1) as shown where 
agreement indicates entity theorist, and (2) written as an opposite where agreement 
indicates incremental theorist (e.g., “Everyone, no matter who they are, can 
significantly change their basic characteristic.”). Correlations between the responses 
was .73 indicating that agreement with the entity theory represents disagreement with 
an incremental theory (and the reverse). 
11 The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct describes a person of integrity as one who 
is “honest and candid” (AICPA 2001, ¶54.02). The IIA’s Rules of Conduct describes 
integrity as working with “honesty, diligence, and responsibility,” law-abiding, and 
ethical (IIA 2001, ¶1.1.1-4). 
12 A six-point scale was chosen for two reasons: (1) An even numbered scale was 
chosen so no middle or neutral point is available; and (2) six was chosen so that each 
half of the scale would have a center point toward which a respondent would gravitate 




of the scale, the center point, agree, can be modified to strongly agree or somewhat 
agree. 
13 The seven distracter statements were adapted with permission from the “Locus of 
Control & Attribution Style Test” (Jerabek 1996) which contains 33 questions. The 
questions were originally responded to on a 5-point Likert-type scale with the center 
answer identified as “partially agree/disagree.” For the sake of consistency, a 6-point 
Likert-type scale will be used to respond to all statements. 
14 For example, if a subject agrees (5), strongly agrees (6), and somewhat disagrees (3) 
with the three statements, the average would be 4.67 [(5+6+3)÷3].  
15 Church, McMillan, and Schneider (1998, 2001a, 2001b) used three factors: (1) 
environment, (2) error, and (3) fraud. In this study, environmental factors are 
separated into external (outside the company’s control) and internal (controllable 
through policies and procedures). 
16 The score from the negative traits (self-serving and unintelligent) will be reversed to 
calculate an average score, because agreeing that the director is self-serving is 
disagreeing that the director is not self-serving. The conversion is made by 
subtracting the score from seven. For example, as score of strongly disagree, coded as 
one, will be converted to a score of six (seven minus one).  
17 Some paper instruments contained the same order of questions in individual tasks. If 
these versions affected the responses, the effect will be found in tests for order 
effects. 
18 Two additional statements, used as distractors, are made that are unrelated to 
integrity: “Chris Conaway seems to be intelligent” and “Chris Conaway seems to be 
well-informed.” The response scores to these statements are not used in this research 
project. 
19 Two questions of interest are related to fraud. Five questions are distracters and are 
related to external environment, internal environment, and errors. The response scores 
to these questions are not used in this research project. 
20 Distribution of 100 points between explanations was used by Church, McMillan, and 
Schneider (2001a and 2001b). 
21 RF represents the matrix of RF responses for the MANOVA test. 
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4. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 This chapter contains a description of data collection and the tests of the 
hypotheses in the following six sections: responses and demographics, manipulation 
check, tests of hypothesis 1, tests of hypothesis 2, tests of hypothesis 3, and tests for order 
effects. The remaining section contains alternate tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. 
4.1. Responses and Demographics 
 The hypotheses in this study address how internal auditors use integrity cues 
when assessing the risk of management fraud. Therefore, this experiment requires 
subjects with experience as an internal auditor to respond to the research instrument. This 
section contains a description of how the research instruments were administered, the 
number of useable responses received (and reasons for discarding responses), as well as 
demographic information about the internal auditors who made up the final sample of 
responses. 
4.1.1. Data Collection 
 The research instrument was administered in three ways: (1) in corporate internal 
auditing departments, (2) to local chapters of the Institute of Internal Auditors, and (3) to 
training seminars for internal auditors. First, two corporations circulated paper versions 
of the research instrument (see Appendix A) in their internal auditing departments. Of 
108 instruments delivered to the corporations, 27 responses were received via individual 
postage-paid reply envelopes (response rate of 25%). Second, the paper versions of the 
research instrument were distributed at four seminars (training sessions) and returned via 
the seminar presenter yielding 70 responses. 
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 The third method used to collect data was via local chapters of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA). Six chapter presidents of the IIA agreed to distribute an 
electronic version of the research instrument (see Appendix B). An electronic version of 
the research instrument created in Microsoft Excel was delivered via email to the 
president of the local chapters who forwarded it via email to the chapter members. 
Because these requests were essentially cold (i.e., the members did not agree to complete 
the research instrument prior to receiving it), a lottery was offered as incentive to 
participate.22 The electronic instrument was designed to be downloaded, answered using 
mouse clicks, and saved and emailed back to the researcher. However, the email to which 
the instrument was attached gave the respondent the option to request a paper copy of the 
instrument.23 The six local chapters had approximately 900 members, and 66 responses 
were received (approximate response rate of 7.33%); 59 were electronic versions and 
seven were paper. A total of 163 responses were received (27+70+66). 
4.1.2. Useable Responses 
 Twenty-nine of the 163 responses received were unusable and discarded for the 
following reasons. Two responses were students and reported no internal auditing 
experience.24 Eight responses reported no demographic information, so their internal 
auditing experience could not be determined. Nineteen responses were eliminated 
because the respondent left blank critical, nondemographic responses that were needed 
for formulating a dependent or independent variable. The final sample contained 134 
responses. The responses and omissions are summarized in Table 4 by the source of the 
response and in total. 
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Responses 27 70 66 163 
Omitted:     
Students 0 0 2 2 
No demographic data 1 4 3 8 
Critical data left blank 4 11 4 19 
Total Omitted 5 15 9 29 
Useable Responses 22 55 57 134 
 
4.1.3. Sample Size and Power 
 Using the tables provided by Bratcher, Moran and Zimmer (1970) and 
preliminary data, it was determined that a minimum of 18 observations was needed per 
cell to obtain the desired level of power (see section 3.2.). In six cells, 108 responses 
were needed (18×6). A total of 163 were collected to obtain 18 responses per cell. 
However, after deletion of responses that were missing critical data, one cell contained 
only 17 responses. The distribution of responses per cell is shown in Table 5. 
4.1.4. Demographic Data 
 The 134 respondents in the final sample reported having an average of more than 
six years of auditing experience, of which more than four years are in internal auditing. 
They reported having a total of 83 certifications and various degrees including 36 post-
baccalaureate. The demographic information collected from respondents is summarized 
in Table 6. Respondents reported taking an average of 17 minutes to complete the 
research instrument. 
Table 5. Responses per cell in a 2×3 design 
 CUE: Integrity of management  
Respondents’ Implicit Theory High Medium Low Total 
Incremental Theorist 18 23 20 61  
Entity Theorist 32 24 17 73 
Totals 50 47 37 134 
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Table 6. Demographics of respondents 
Panel A: Experience     
 Mean Median Min Max 
Auditing Experience (years) a 6.37 4.50 0.08 35.00 
Internal Auditing Experience (years) 4.54 2.50 0.08 30.00 
Experience with topic b 0.52 0.56 0.00 1.00 
     
Panel B: Education    
 Bachelors Post-Baccalaureate c  
Accounting 74 8   
Business (nonaccounting) 45 26 d   
Nonbusiness 17 2   
Total 136 36   
     
Panel C: Certifications     
  Count   
Certified Internal Auditor 19   
Certified Public Accountant 36   
Certified Fraud Examiner 4   
Certified Management Accountant 1   
Certified Information Systems Auditor 9   
Other 14   
Total 83   
    
Panel D: Current job titles    
 Count   
Auditor/Internal Auditor 62   
Senior Auditor 16   
Systems Auditor 3   
Audit Manager 11   
Director (VP) of Internal Audit 10   
Consultant 7   
Other 25   
Total 134   
a Auditing experience includes both internal and external experience. 
b Respondents were asked, “What is your level of experience with the audit of expenses (not necessarily 
vehicle maintenance expenses) as described in the task?” Their response was made by marking one of 
a series of 51 circles ranging from Low to High. (The response mechanism was similar to Task 2A; 
see section 3.3.3.1.) Their responses were scaled between 0 and 1; see equation (3). 
c The Post Baccalaureate degrees were all at the Master’s level except for one Juris Doctorate. 
d The Post Baccalaureate degrees labeled as business (nonaccounting) include MBAs. 
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4.1.5. Demographic Effects on Variables 
 Eight variables were measured using subjects’ responses: implicit theory of 
integrity (IT2),25 risk of fraud (three measures RF1, RF2, and RF3), integrity inference 
(INFER1 and INFER2), and information requested (CINFO and BINFO). T-tests and 
regressions are used to investigate whether subjects’ demographics had an effect on how 
the subjects responded. The test statistics are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Effect of demographics on response variables 
Panel A: T-test statistic to test H0: Dichotomous demographic has no effect on variable 
 Dichotomous demographics a 
Variable CIA CPA CFE CMA CISA Other Cert Post-bacc 
IT2 –0.47 –2.44 b –0.68 0.50 –0.85 –0.21 –0.41 
RF1 –1.13 –1.39 –0.55 1.93 b –0.99 2.83 b,c 0.22 
RF2 –2.12 b –0.58 1.20 0.43 –1.31 1.14 0.68 
RF3 –0.16 –0.04 –0.91 0.98 –0.41 1.25 0.80 
INFER1 1.81 –0.22 –1.22 0.17 0.53 –1.50 –0.55 
INFER2 1.52 –0.94 –0.55 –0.65 –0.05 –1.23 0.22 
CINFO –1.00 0.71 –0.44 0.46 0.27 –0.47 –1.18 
BINFO 1.39 –1.61 –1.76 0.46 0.08 –1.04 1.49 
 
Panel B: T-value to test H0: Continuous demographic has no effect on variable 




Months as  





IT2 0.46 –0.46 0.94 0.16 
RF1 –1.62 0.80 1.95 –0.41 
RF2 –1.43 1.21 2.03 b 0.83 
RF3 –0.91 0.22 1.67 –0.38 
INFER1 0.76 –0.12 –0.86 –0.67 
INFER2 0.21 0.47 –0.74 –1.13 
CINFO 2.13 b –1.95 –0.82 0.73 
BINFO 0.62 –0.07 –0.68 –0.28 
a The dichotomous demographics indicate whether or not the respondent holds a CIA, CPA, 
CFE, CME, CMA, CISA, other certification, or post-baccalaureate degree. 
b Significant at the Type I error rate of 0.05. 
c Significant at the family-wise Type I error rate of 0.05 using a Bonferroni technique for 
multiple comparisons. 
d The continuous demographics indicate (1) the level of experience the respondent had with 
auditing expenses, (2) the time the respondent spent responding to the research instrument, 
(3) the months the respondent spent as an auditor (both internal and external), and (4) the 
months spent as an internal auditor. 
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 Seven dichotomous demographics were investigated for their effect on the eight 
measured variables. These demographics represent whether the respondent (1) is a 
Certified Internal Auditor, (2) is a Certified Public Accountant, (3) is a Certified Fraud 
Examiner, (4) is a Certified Managerial Accountant, (5) is a Certified Information 
Systems Auditor, (6) has another certification, and (7) holds a post-baccalaureate degree. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the individual t-test reveal four significant results. 
However, when using a Bonferroni technique to control for family-wise error rate, only 
one of the demographic variables was shown to significantly impact a dependent 
variable.  
 First, the dependent variable RF2, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the client 
about whom the integrity cue was given less the feasibility of fraud on the part of the 
CEO, was significantly different depending on whether the respondent was a Certified 
Internal Auditor. The respondents with a CIA had a mean RF2 of 0.28 while the non-
CIAs had a mean RF2 of 0.13. Second, the independent variable implicit theory (IT) was 
significantly different depending on whether or not the respondent was a Certified Public 
Accountant. The CPAs had a mean value of 3.98 for IT2 while the non-CPAs had a mean 
value of 3.44.  
 Third, the dependent variable RF1, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the client 
about whom the integrity cue was given, was significantly different depending on 
whether the respondent was a Certified Management Accountant. The respondents with a 
CMA had a mean RF1 of 0.10 while the non-CMAs had a mean RF1 of 0.57. However, 
only one respondent reported having a CMA making the mean of 0.10 the response of 
one auditor. These three demographic variables were found to be significant at an alpha 
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level of 0.05. However, when that alpha was distributed among the tests (of each 
demographic) using a Bonferroni technique (used to control Type I error rates), these 
three variables do not meet the criteria for statistical significance. 
 Finally, the dependent variable RF1, the feasibility of fraud on the part of the 
client about whom the integrity cue was given, was significantly different depending on 
whether the respondent held a certification not specifically asked about. The respondents 
with these other certifications had a mean RF1 of 0.40, while those who reported no other 
certifications had a mean RF1 of 0.59. These means are significantly different even when 
controlling for family-wise error rate. No indication was given about what the other 
certification was held by each respondent. 
 In addition, four continuous demographics were investigated for their effect on 
the eight measured dependent variables. These four demographics represent (1) the 
number of months the respondent has been an auditor (internal plus external), (2) the 
number of months the respondent has been an internal auditor, (3) the respondent’s 
experience auditing expenses, and (4) the amount of time the respondent reported 
spending on the research instrument. As shown in Panel B of Table 7, two significant 
results were found.  
 The variable RF2 was significantly affected by the amount of experience the 
respondent reported having with the audit of expenses. As this self-reported experience 
increased (between zero and one), regression analysis indicated that RF2 increased (β = 
0.004, t-value = 2.03, p-value = 0.0447). Colbert’s (1989) review of experience literature 
determined that the experience generally does not affect structured tasks, which most of 
the tasks in this study are, but does affect unstructured and complex tasks. If any of these 
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variables could be thought to measure a complex concept, it would be RF2, which 
represents the difference in the feasibility of fraud perpetrated by Conaway (about whom 
an integrity cue is given) and the feasibility of fraud perpetrated by Alexander (no 
integrity cue). Though this test yields significant statistical results, the change in the 
measurement is of little or no practical significance due to the small size of the parameter 
estimate: as experience with audit of expenses (self-reported) moves from its minimum to 
maximum value, the feasibility of fraud committed by Conaway as opposed to other 
(scaled from zero to one) changes only 0.004. 
 Second, the variable CINFO, the proportion of information requested about 
Conaway’s character, was significantly affected by the amount of time the respondent 
spent as an auditor. As months auditing increased, regression analysis indicated that 
CINFO increased (β = 0.0007, t-value = 2.13, p-value = 0.0351). Again, though this is a 
statistically significant effect, the practical implications are very small: for every month 
of audit experience, the proportion of (percent of total) character-related information 
requested would increase 0.0007. 
4.2. Manipulation Check 
 One variable, the level of integrity of a member of management (CUE), is 
manipulated in this experiment. There are three levels of CUE: high, medium, and low. In 
Task 2C, a manipulation check, the respondents were asked to assess six characteristics 
of the member of management: four related to integrity and two related to intelligence. 
The respondents used a six-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to 
respond to the six statements, which were phrased “Chris Conaway seems ... .” For 
example, “Chris Conaway seems to have integrity.”  
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 Three variables were constructed using these responses. INFER1 is the response 
to the statement about integrity. INFER2 is the average of the four responses about 
integrity traits (integrity, candid, responsible, and self-serving). INFER3 is the average of 
the two distracter statements related to intelligence (well-informed and unintelligent). 
Table 8, describes the responses to the manipulation check. To determine whether the 
manipulation affected the respondents’ assessments of the client’s integrity, four 
techniques were used: (1) boxplots, (2) correlation between CUE and the respondents’ 
inferences, (3) ANOVA tests to determine the significance of CUE on the response, and 
(4) a series of two-sample t-tests determine directionality of the manipulation effect. The 
details of these examinations follow. 
 
Table 8. Manipulation check responses and statistics 
Panel A: Responses to manipulation check 
Variables a Mean Std Dev     
INFER1 3.17 1.04     
INFER2 3.20 0.84     
INFER3 4.04 0.68     
       
 
Panel B: Responses to manipulation check by integrity cue subgroup 
 CUE = High CUE = Medium CUE = Low 
Variables Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
INFER1 3.81 0.88 3.17 1.07 2.72 0.88 
INFER2 3.81 0.77 3.09 0.76 2.86 0.72 
INFER3 4.32 0.58 3.99 0.73 3.88 0.66 
a INFER1 is the subjects’ response to the statement about to integrity. 
INFER2 is the average of the four responses to the statements related to integrity: integrity, candid, 
responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable is 
reversed.) 
INFER3 is the average of the remaining two characteristics not related to integrity: well-informed and 




4.2.1. Graphical Depiction of Integrity Inference 
 Side-by-side boxplots are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The boxplots indicate that as 
the client’s integrity is manipulated upward, the mean and median of the integrity 
inference made by the respondent also moves upward. Both figures indicate that there is a 
larger spread of inferences for the middle level of the manipulated variable. In addition, 
the boxplots indicate that there are outlying observations, a total of three: one observation 
where the value of CUE is -1 and INFER1 is 5, and two observations where the value of 
CUE is 1 and INFER2 is 2. Subsequent statistical tests are conducted both with these 
three observations included and with them omitted. The results with the omitted outliers 
are reported only if there is a significant difference in the test results. 
4.2.2. Correlation of Integrity Manipulation and Resulting Inference 
 The correlation between two variables indicates the degree to which two variables 
move together; that is, as one increases, what happens to the other. While correlation is 
not an indication of cause-and-effect, it is a measure of the strength of the relationship 
between the variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE and INFER1 
(integrity) is 0.417 (p-value <0.0001), and the Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE 
and INFER2 (integrity traits) is 0.442 (p-value <0.0001).26 The positive coefficient 
indicates that the variables have a direct relationship (i.e., they move in the same 
direction). That is, as the manipulation CUE goes from low to high integrity, the 
respondents inference about the client’s integrity also increases. The statistical 
significance (p-values) indicates that statistically, a correlation exists; however, the low 
coefficient depicts a weak association.  
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 The Pearson correlation coefficient for CUE and INFER3 is 0.254 (p-value 
<0.0030). The integrity manipulation represented by CUE, was not intended to 
manipulate the respondents inference about the client’s intelligence (measured by 
INFER3). The correlation shows a very weak but statistically significant correlation 
between CUE and INFER3. 
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 INFER1 is the subjects’ response to the statement about to integrity. 
Figure 2. Side-by-side boxplots of INFER1 by the manipulated variable CUE 
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4.2.3. Analysis of Variance between Manipulation Levels 
 To determine if the manipulation (CUE) had an effect on the respondents’ mean 
inferences about the client’s integrity (INFER1 and INFER2) and intelligence (INFER3), 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test was used. Like ANOVA, MANOVA 
is used to test whether the dependent means of the subsamples (divided on the 
independent variable CUE) are significantly different. In the case of MANOVA, the 
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 INFER2 is the average of the four subject responses to the statements related to integrity: integrity, 
candid, responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable 
is reversed.) 
Figure 3. Side-by-side boxplots of INFER2 by the manipulated variable CUE 
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dependent means are represented by vectors composed of three dependent variables: 
INFER1, INFER2, and INFER3. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this MANOVA test 
has a value of 0.755 (F-value = 6.49 and p-value <0.0001). This test offers strong 
statistical evidence that the mean vectors are significantly different among manipulated 
levels of the variable CUE. 
 Three separate ANOVA tests were used to investigate the effect that CUE has on 
each of the three inference variables separately. The first ANOVA was used to answer 
the question “Did the manipulation have an effect on the respondents’ mean answers to 
‘Chris Conaway seems to have integrity,’” which was coded as INFER1 and had an 
average response of 3.17 on a six-point scale (where six is strongly agree). When the 
sample was divided by the manipulated integrity variable (CUE) as shown in Table 8 
Panel B, the responses were 3.81 for the high integrity, 3.17 for medium integrity, and 
2.72 for low integrity. The ANOVA test shown in Table 9 revealed that the effect of CUE 
is significant (F Value = 14.00 with a p-value less than 0.0001). The manipulation was 
successful in effecting the respondents’ mean impression of the client’s integrity when 
the CUE revealed higher (lower) integrity. 
 The second ANOVA was used to answer the question “Did the manipulation have 
an effect on the respondents’ mean answers to the four integrity-characteristic statements 
(integrity, candid, responsible, self-serving).” The responses were averaged to create the 
variable INFER2 (with the negative characteristic, self-serving, being reversed). The 
average response was 3.20 on a six-point scale (where six is strongly agree). When the 
sample was divided by the manipulated variable, the responses were 3.81 for the high 
integrity, 3.09 for medium integrity, and 2.86 for low integrity. The ANOVA test  
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Square F Value Pr > F 
INFER1 Model 2 25.31 12.65 14.00 <0.0001 
 Error 131 118.39 0.90   
       
INFER2 Model 2 20.15 10.07 17.95 <0.0001 
 Error 131 73.50 0.56   
       
INFER3 Model 2 4.39 2.20 4.99 0.0081 
 Error 131 57.63 0.44   
       
a INFER1 is the response to the statement about to integrity. 
INFER2 is the average to the four response to the statements related to integrity: integrity, candid, 
responsible, and self-serving. (Because it is a negative characteristic, the self-serving variable is 
reversed.) 
INFER3 is the average of the remaining two characteristics not related to integrity: well-informed and 
unintelligent. (Unintelligent is reversed.) 
 
revealed that the effect of CUE is significant (F Value = 17.95 with a p-value less than 
0.0001). The manipulation was successful in effecting the respondents’ impression of the 
client’s integrity characteristics when the CUE revealed higher (lower) integrity. 
 The third ANOVA tested the effect of the manipulation on the two traits not 
related to integrity; these two statements were related to the intelligence of Conaway: 
informed and unintelligent (reversed for analysis). The average response from these two 
statements is denoted as INFER3, which had a mean response of 4.04. When the sample 
was divided by the manipulated variable, the responses were 4.32 for the high integrity, 
3.99 for medium integrity, and 3.88 for low integrity. The ANOVA test revealed that the 
effect of CUE is significant (F Value = 4.99 with a p-value less than 0.0081). If CUE 
made an inference only about integrity, INFER3 shouldn’t be significant at all. However, 
the significance of this variable could be due to an overall positive or negative impression 
of Conaway.  
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4.2.4. T-test of Manipulation Directionality 
 Individual t-tests were conducted to determine if the directionality (as depicted in 
Figure 4) represents a significant difference between the auditors’ inference of client 
integrity variables (INFER) at the various levels of the integrity variable (CUE). For each 
of the three inference variables, three t-tests were conducted to compare high to medium 
integrity, medium to low integrity, and high integrity to low integrity. The results of the 













































Figure 4. The effect of integrity on auditor’s mean inference of integrity 
 
 
Table 10. Directionality of assessed integrity between levels of integrity (CUE) 










Variable t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
INFER1 2.27 0.0256  2.95 0.0042  5.72 <0.0001 
INFER2 1.53 0.1293  4.28 <0.0001  5.92 <0.0001 
INFER3 0.78 0.4387  2.29 0.0247  3.27 0.0016 
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 As expected from the results of the ANOVA tests presented in Table 9, many of 
the differences were significant and in the expected direction (i.e., as CUE increased, so 
did INFER). For all the inference variables the difference between the respondents’ mean 
inference was significantly different between the high and low manipulated integrity 
levels of the variable CUE. Also, for all three inference variables, the difference between 
the respondents’ mean inference was significantly different between the high and 
medium manipulated levels of integrity. However, the difference between the medium 
and low manipulated levels of integrity was only significant for the variable INFER1. 
The significance and directional differences of INFER1 between all three levels of CUE 
indicates that the manipulation was successful in influencing the respondents’ impression 
about the client’s integrity. 
4.3. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1 (the alternative form) states that when assessing the risk of 
management fraud, internal auditors will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the 
client’s integrity. For this hypothesis to be accepted, the variable CUE, the manipulated 
variable about the client’s integrity, will have a significant impact on the internal 
auditor’s (respondent’s) assessed risk of fraud. 
4.3.1. Assessed Risk of Fraud, the Dependent Variable 
 Three measures of the auditor’s risk of fraud were made in the research 
instrument. RF1 is feasibility that fraud by Conaway is an explanation (one of seven) for 
a change in an analytic. The assessment was made by marking one of 51 circles, the 
farther to the right indicating more feasibility. The variable is scaled between zero and 
one (see formula 3).  
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 The mean assessment for RF1 was 0.570, and is presented in Table 11 Panel A 
along with the variable’s standard deviation. In addition, Table 10 Panel B also presents 
the means of sub-samples when the variable is subdivided by the integrity cue given in 
the research instrument. A side-by-side boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in 
Figure 5. Visually, it appears that as integrity (CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of 
fraud (RF1) decreases as predicted. However, the interquartile range for the third sub-
sample (CUE=1) depicts less of a consensus by the respondents. The boxplots offer 
evidence of one outlier: CUE = –1 and RF1 = 0.05. Subsequent statistical tests using RF1 
as the dependent variable are conducted both with this observation included and with it 
omitted. The results with the omitted outlier are reported only if there is a difference in 
the test conclusions.   
 RF2 is the difference in feasibility that fraud was committed by Conaway and that 
fraud was committed by Alexander (the CEO of the parent company). Because there was 
no evidence about Alexander’s integrity, the difference can be attributed (at least in part) 
to the integrity cue given about Conaway. This variable is also scaled between zero and 
one; the mean assessment for RF2 was 0.158. Because it is greater than zero, on average  
Table 11. Risk of fraud measurements 
Panel A: Mean responses to risk of fraud measurements 
Variablesa Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum   
RF1 0.570 0.240 0.000 1.000   
RF2 0.158 0.271 –0.360 0.900   
RF3 0.252 0.205 0.000 0.800   
       
 
Panel B: Mean responses to risk of fraud measurements by integrity cue subgroups 
 CUE = High CUE = Medium CUE = Low 
Variables Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
RF1 0.526 0.277 0.531 0.235 0.640 0.214 
RF2 0.162 0.275 0.134 0.233 0.178 0.304 
RF3 0.229 0.195 0.203 0.187 0.315 0.215 
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 RF1 is the response variable that represents the feasibility that fraud on the part of Conaway is the 
reason for the reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales. 
Figure 5. Side-by-side boxplots of RF1 by the manipulated variable CUE 
 
the respondents believed it was more feasible that Conaway (as opposed to Alexander) 
committed fraud to change the analytic. This data is presented in Table 11, and a side-by-
side boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in Figure 6. Visually, it appears that as 
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integrity (CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of fraud (RF2) is virtually unchanged. In 
addition, the boxplots offer evidence of one outlier: where CUE = 0 and RF2=.84. 
Subsequent statistical tests using RF2 as the dependent variable are conducted both with 
this observation included and with it omitted. The results with the omitted outlier are 
reported only if there is a difference in the test conclusions. 
 RF3 is the assessed probability that fraud was the reason for the change in 
analytic. This assessment was made by distributing 100 points among four possible  
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 RF2 is the response variable that represents the difference in feasibility between fraud on the part of 
Conaway and fraud on the part of Alexander as the reason for the reduction in maintenance expenses 
relative to sales. 
Figure 6. Side-by-side boxplots of RF2 by the manipulated variable CUE 
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explanatory factors, one of which was intentional misstatement (fraud). RF3 is scaled 
between zero and one by taking the points assigned to fraud and dividing by 100. The 
mean assessment was 0.252. This data is presented in Table 11, and a side-by-side 
boxplot of these sub-samples is presented in Figure 7. Visually, it appears that as integrity 
(CUE) goes up, the mean assessed risk of fraud (RF3) does not follow the expected 
pattern (decreasing). The decrease is obvious from the low-integrity case (CUE = –1) to 
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 RF3 is the response variable that represents the difference in probability that fraud is the reason for the 
reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales. 
Figure 7. Side-by-side boxplots of RF3 by the manipulated variable CUE 
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the other two levels; however, the expected decrease in RF3 from medium integrity (CUE 
= 0) to high integrity (CUE = 1) is not seen. This boxplot offers evidence of one outlier: 
CUE = 1 and RF3 = .75. Subsequent statistical tests using RF3 as the dependent variable 
are conducted both with this observation included and with it omitted. The results with 
the omitted outlier are reported only if there is a significant difference in the test results. 
4.3.2. Analysis of Variance of Fraud Risk Assessment between Integrity Levels 
 A MANOVA test was conducted to test hypothesis 1 (null form): the effect of 
client’s integrity (CUE) has no effect on the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, 
and RF3). The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this MANOVA test has a value of 0.913 
(F-value = 1.99 and p-value 0.0669). However, when the three outliers (described in 
section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this MANOVA test, the Wilks’ Lambda test statistic 
becomes 0.891 (F-value = 2.52 and p-value of 0.0219), which offers evidence that the 
mean vectors of the three dependent variables are significantly different among the 
manipulated levels of the variable CUE. This evidence supports rejecting the null version 
of hypothesis 1 in favor of the alternative, that CUE has an effect on the auditors’ means 
assessed risk of fraud. 
 Three separate ANOVA tests were used to investigate the effect that CUE has on 
each of the three risk assessment variables (RF1, RF2, and RF3) separately. Table 12 
presents the results of these three ANOVA tests. The three ANOVA tests were repeated 
with the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) omitted, but the results of the tests 
were not significantly changed. 
 ANOVA tests the difference in the subsample means of the risk assessment 
variables that were divided by the variable CUE. ANOVA is used to answer the question,  
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Square F Value Pr > F 
RF1 Model 2 0.384 0.192 3.33 0.039 
 Error 131 7.539 0.057   
       
RF2 Model 2 0.047 0.023 0.31 0.736 
 Error 131 9.755 0.074   
       
RF3 Model 2 0.329 0.164 4.09 0.019 
 Error 131 5.261 0.040   
       
 
 “Are the means of the means of the subsamples from the same population?” The results 
of these tests indicate that the subsample means of RF1 and RF3 are significantly 
different (from different populations). However, these results are not seen for the variable 
RF2. These three ANOVA tests offer mixed evidence about hypothesis 1, but in general 
support the rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative.  
4.3.3. Directionality of Mean Assessed Risk of Fraud between Integrity Levels 
 For hypothesis 1 to be supported, as client’s integrity is increased, the auditors’ 
assessed risk of fraud would be decreased, but this is not the case. As depicted in Figure 8 
and in Table 11, assessed risk of fraud is decreased as integrity goes from low to medium 
for all three risk assessment variables, which is expected. However  the risk of fraud is 
slightly increased as integrity goes from medium to high in some cases. For each of the 
three risk assessment variables, three individual t-tests were conducted to compare low 
integrity to medium integrity, medium integrity to high integrity, and low integrity to 
high integrity. The results of the nine t-tests are presented in Table 13. 
 As Figure 8 depicts, the t-tests reveal that for RF1 and RF3, the mean assessed 
risks of fraud were significantly high for low integrity compared to medium integrity and 






































Figure 8. The effect of integrity on auditor’s assess risk of fraud 
 
 
Table 13. Directionality of risk of fraud (RF) between levels of integrity (CUE) 
Low to Medium  Medium to High  Low to High 
H: RFL–RFM>0  H: RFM–RFH>0  H: RFL–RFH>0 
Risk of 
Fraud 
Variable t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
RF1 2.38 0.0192  0.08 0.9349  2.15 0.0344 
RF2 0.78 0.4369  –0.49 0.6261  0.25 0.8015 
RF3 2.71 0.0079  –0.61 0.5413  1.91 0.0591 
 
fraud (RF1 and RF3) were not significantly different from the medium to high levels of 
integrity. None of the means were significantly different for the variable RF2, as 
expected given the ANOVA results. These results seem to indicate that auditors found the 
low-integrity cue (defined by tardiness, absenteeism, and deception) an indicator of lower 
integrity leading to a potential for fraud. The auditors did not find the medium-integrity 
cue (defined by tardiness and absenteeism) or the high-integrity cue (defined by telling 
the truth even if it meant losing a charitable donation) significantly different indicators of 
the client’s integrity with respect to a potential for fraud. 
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4.4. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 1 tested the main effect of the client’s integrity (CUE) on the auditors’ 
mean assessed risk of fraud (RF). Hypothesis 2, tests the interaction effect of client’s 
integrity (CUE) with the auditor’s implicit theory of integrity (IT) on the auditors’ mean 
assessed risk of fraud (RF). Hypothesis 2 (alternative form) states that when assessing the 
risk of management fraud, internal auditors who are entity theorists of integrity will 
weight the moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those who are 
incremental theorists of integrity, versus the null of no interaction effect. 
 An auditor’s implicit theory of integrity identifies the auditor as an entity theorist 
or an incremental theorist; entity theorists are theoretically more likely to use an integrity 
cue to predict future behavior than are incremental theorist. Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
entity-theorist auditors’ mean assessed risk of fraud will be more extreme than that of the 
incremental-theorist auditors. Each respondent (auditor) is identified as an entity theorists 
or incremental theorist by the variable IT1, a dichotomous variable that is coded zero for 
incremental theorists and one for entity theorists. For each respondent, there are three 
measures of the assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, and RF3). The mean response for each 
of the three risk-of-fraud variables is presented in Table 14. Graphs of these means are 
presented in three separate graphs in Figure 9. In addition to the overall mean, mean 
responses are presented for each of the six cells defined by the auditor’s implicit theory 
(IT1; entity or incremental) and the integrity cue (CUE; high, medium or low). 
 To test hypothesis 2, the models specified in formula (5) and formula (6) are used. 
In both cases the effect of interest for hypothesis 2 is the interaction effect on the 
auditor’s assessed risk of fraud. There are three measures of the risk of fraud (RF1, RF2,  
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Table 14. Mean assessed risk of fraud by cell (CUE×IT1) 
Panel A: Assessed risk of fraud (RF1) 
 Implicit Theory Client Integrity (CUE)  
 (IT1) High Medium Low Totals  
 Entity 0.618 0.539 0.648 0.605  
 Incremental 0.449 0.523 0.626 0.529  
 Totals 0.526 0.531 0.640 0.570  
 
Panel B: Assessed risk of fraud (RF2) 
  Client Integrity (CUE)  
  High Medium Low Totals  
Entity 0.191 0.104 0.179 0.157  
Incremental 0.137 0.166 0.176 0.159  
Implicit Theory 
(IT1) 
Totals 0.162 0.134 0.178 0.158  
 
Panel C: Assessed risk of fraud (RF3) 
  Client Integrity (CUE)  
  High Medium Low Totals  
Entity 0.240 0.240 0.302 0.267  
Incremental 0.220 0.165 0.338 0.234  
Implicit Theory 
(IT1) 
Totals 0.229 0.203 0.315 0.252  
 
and RF3; see section 4.3.1.) and two measures of the implicit theory (IT1 and IT2; see 
section 3.3.1.1.), resulting in a need for two types of tests of hypothesis 2: those with the 
dichotomous version and those with the continuous measure of the implicit theory. The 
results of theses tests are presented in the following two sections based on the 
measurement of IT used. 
4.4.1. Tests of Hypothesis 2 with a Dichotomous Measure of Implicit Theory 
 A MANOVA test was conducted to test whether the hypothesis 2 model (see 
equation 5), which created a six-cell design, resulted in significantly different mean 
vectors (made of RF1, RF2, and RF3) between cells. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for 
this MANOVA test has a value of 0.919 (F-value = 1.83 and p-value 0.0942). However,  
when the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this MANOVA test, 












































































































Figure 9. The main and interaction effect of CUE and IT2 on assess risk of fraud 
 
71 
which offers evidence that the mean vectors of the three dependent variables are 
significantly different among the six cells defined by the interaction of CUE and IT1.  
 Three individual ANOVA tests were conducted to assess the significance of the 
interaction of implicit theory (IT1) and client’s integrity (CUE) on the individual assessed 
risks of fraud. The results of these ANOVA tests are presented in Table 15, Panel A. 
These individual ANOVA tests reveal that the model (main and interaction effects of 
CUE and IT1) is responsible for different cell means in two of the assessed risk of fraud, 
measures RF1 and RF3, but not for RF2.  
 Panel B of Table 15 shows the individual F values that test the effect of the 
independent variables on the cell mean differences. In all three ANOVA tests, the 
interaction of CUE and IT1 does not have a significant effect on the assessed risk of 
fraud. These nonsignificant results do not support an interaction effect. 
Table 15. The main and interaction effects of CUE and IT1 on assessed risk of fraud 







Square F Value Pr > F 
RF1 Model 2 0.384 0.192 3.33 0.039 
 Error 131 7.539 0.057   
       
RF2 Model 2 0.047 0.023 0.31 0.736 
 Error 131 9.755 0.074   
       
RF3 Model 2 0.329 0.164 4.09 0.019 
 Error 131 5.261 0.040   
 
Panel B: ANOVA tests of independent variables 
 Independent Variables 
CUE IT1 CUE×IT2 Dependent 
Variables F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F 
RF1 3.38 0.0370 2.17 0.1434 1.78 0.1844 
RF2 0.30 0.7394 0.02 0.8996 0.13 0.7236 
RF3 4.06 0.0195 0.31 0.5788 0.52 0.4722 
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4.4.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 with a Continuous Measure of Implicit Theory 
 The rule used to assign respondents to entity or incremental theorists is as 
follows: the responses (on a six-point scale) to three statements regarding integrity are 
averaged; if the average is greater than 3.5 (indicating general agreement that integrity is 
a fixed characteristic) the respondent is an entity theorist, and an average of less than 3.5 
(indicating general disagreement) makes the respondent an incremental theorist. Using 
that rule, a respondent with an average score of four (somewhat agree) would be an entity 
theorist just like a respondent with an average score of six (strongly agree). Theoretically, 
an entity theorist with an average score of six would weight the integrity cue more than 
the entity theorist with a score of four. In other words, the implicit theory variable might 
be more descriptive if it were a continuous variable (represented as IT2) as opposed to a 
dichotomous variable (IT1). A frequency distribution of IT2 is shown in Figure 10. 
 A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to test hypothesis 2 (null 
form): the effect of the interaction of client’s integrity (CUE) and the auditor’s implicit 















Figure 10. Frequency distribution of implicit theory responses (IT2) 
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The model specified in formula (6) was used, where RF is a matrix of the three RF 
variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’ Lambda test statistic for this multivariate 
regression test has a value of 0.883 (F-value = 1.80 and p-value 0.0677). However, when 
the three outliers (described in section 4.3.1.) are omitted from this test, the Wilks’ 
Lambda test statistic becomes 0.866 (F-value = 2.05 and p-value of 0.0337), which offers 
evidence that the model is a significant determinant of the three dependent variables.  
 Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to 
assess the significance of the interaction model and its components on the dependent 
variable. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 16. For hypothesis 2 (null 
form) to be rejected in favor of the alternative, the interaction would have to yield a β3 
significantly less than zero. β3 is not significant in any of the three regressions. There is 
no evidence to support rejecting the null hypothesis of no interaction effect. After 
removing the outliers (see section 4.3.1.), the results were virtually unchanged. However, 
for the dependent variable RF1, the p-value on the interaction decreased to 0.0598 for a 
parameter estimate of 0.041. 
Table 16. The effect of integrity and implicit theory (IT2) on assessed risk of fraud 
IT2CUEIT2CUERF 3210 ×+++= ββββ  
Dep. Variable = RF1 Dep. Variable = RF2 Dep. Variable = RF3 Independent 
Variables β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value 
Intercept β0 0.417 <0.0001 0.085 0.2710 0.152 0.0082 
CUE β1 –0.172 0.0453 –0.108 0.2732 –0.073 0.3146 
IT2 β2 0.043 0.0177 0.021 0.3066 0.027 0.0743 
CUE*IT2 β3 0.033 0.1361 0.028 0.2801 0.009 0.6241 
       
 R2 0.0897  0.0165  0.0554  
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4.5. Tests of Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 (alternative form) states that entity-theorist auditor will request more 
additional character information than will incremental-theorist auditors. Given a space to 
request six additional pieces of information respondents requested between zero and six. 
These requests were coded as being related to character information of Conaway or 
related to the incentive bonus Conaway stood to receive. The portion of character 
information was calculated as the number of character-information requests divided by 
the total number of requests and coded as the variable CINFO, a continuous variable 
between zero and one. A similar computation was made to create the variable related to 
bonus information, BINFO, a continuous variable between zero and one. The mean 
responses for these variables are presented in Table 17; in addition, the means of 
subgroups (distinguished by the respondents’ implicit theory, IT1, and the level of the 
integrity cue received, CUE) are also presented. 
4.5.1. Tests of Hypothesis 3 with a Dichotomous Measure of Implicit Theory 
 For hypothesis 3 (alternative form) to be supported, the mean additional 
information requested by the entity theorists must be significantly greater than the mean  
Table 17. Mean additional information requested by type 
Panel A: Portion of additional information requested related to character (CINFO) 
  Client Integrity (CUE)  
  High Medium Low Totals  
Entity 0.071 0.049 0.047 0.053  
Incremental 0.113 0.120 0.042 0.094  
Implicit Theory 
(IT1) 
Totals 0.093 0.084 0.045 0.072  
 
Panel B: Portion of additional information requested related to bonus (BINFO) 
  Client Integrity (CUE)  
  High Medium Low Totals  
Entity 0.073 0.073 0.052 0.064  
Incremental 0.018 0.036 0.032 0.029  
Implicit Theory 
(IT1) 
Totals 0.043 0.055 0.045 0.048  
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information requested by the incremental theorists. Two t-tests were used to make this 
determination.  
 The first t-test tests the alternative hypothesis that character information requested 
by entity theorists is greater than character information requested by incremental theorists 
(CINFOET>CINFOIT). The difference in the group means of CINFO is 0.041, with the 
CINFOIT being larger than CINFOET; it appears from the means themselves that this 
hypothesis will be rejected. The test statistic (using pooled variance) has a value of –1.54 
and a p-value of 0.1268, which does not support rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 The second t-test tests the alternative hypothesis that the bonus information 
requested by entity theorists is greater than the bonus information requested by 
incremental theorists (BINFOET>BINFOIT). The difference in the group means of BINFO 
is 0.035, with the BINFOET being larger than BINFOIT. The test statistic (using pooled 
variance) has a value of 1.88 and a p-value of 0.0625, which does not support rejecting 
the null hypothesis. 
4.5.2. Tests of Hypothesis 3 with a Continuous Measure of Implicit Theory 
 As stated earlier, the dichotomous variable used to describe the implicit theory 
(IT1) may fail to capture differences between two respondents categorized as an entity 
(or incremental) theorists who have a difference in their continuous implicit theory score 
(IT2). Therefore, the tests of hypothesis 3 were rerun using the continuous version of the 
independent variable. Two regressions analyses were conducted to examine the effects of 
implicit theory (IT2) on types of additional information requested (CINFO and BINFO) 
using the following model:  
eNFO  IT2I 10 ++= ββ . (7) 
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For hypothesis 3 (alternative form) to be supported, as IT2 increases (as the respondent 
moves toward an entity theorist), the additional information requested related to character 
or bonus should also increase. In other words β1 should be positive.  
 The results of these two tests are presented in Table 18. There was no evidence to 
support the hypothesis that implicit theory (IT2) would have an effect on the amount of 
character information requested (CINFO); the value of β1 is –0.012 with a p-value of 
0.2766. Nor is there significant evidence to support the hypothesis that implicit theory 
(IT2) would have an effect on the amount of bonus information requested (BINFO); the 
value of β1 is 0.015 with a p-value of 0.0585. 
4.5.3. A Possible Interaction Affecting the Results of Hypothesis 3 
 Though there is no theory to support it, it is possible that the integrity of the client 
(CUE) could have a main effect or interaction effect (IT2×CUE) on the quantity and type 
of information requested (CINFO and BINFO). To examine the possibility of such an 
effect, two regression test were conducted using the following model: 
eUETNFO +×+++= IT2CUEC2II 3210 ββββ . (8) 
The main effect of CUE is represented by β2 and the interaction with IT2 is represented 
by β3. If β2 or β3 is significantly different from zero, CUE or the interaction effect of 
Table 18. The effect of the implicit theory (IT2) on information requested 
IT2I 10 ββ +=NFO  
Dep. Variable = BINFO Dep. Variable = CINFO  Independent 
Variable β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value  
Intercept β0 –0.005 0.8564 0.117 0.0076  
IT2 β1 0.015 0.0585 –0.012 0.2766  
      
 R2 0.0271  0.0090   
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CUE×IT2 is significant. Because there is no supporting theory, no prediction is made 
about the significance or direction of these two parameters. The results of these 
regressions are presented in Table 19. Neither β2 nor β3 are significant, offering no 
evidence that client integrity (CUE) or its interaction with auditors’ implicit theory 
(CUE×IT2) has an effect on the quantity or type of additional information requested.  
4.6. Tests for Order Effects 
 Regression analysis was used to determine whether the order of questions in a 
particular task had an effect on the variable measured from that task. For the most part, 
each research instrument had a different, randomized order of questions in each task to 
avoid the effects of order. See Appendix B for a complete description of randomization. 
No order of questions was found to have a significant effect on the responses. A list of all 
the tests run and their significance is presented in Table 20. 
4.7. Alternative Tests of Hypotheses 
 The planned tests described in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, essentially yielded mixed 
or no evidence in support of the three hypotheses. This research project investigates the 
effect of two independent variables on the auditors’ assessed risk of management fraud. 
The first independent variable is the auditors’ implicit theory, a personal characteristic  
Table 19. The effect of the implicit theory and integrity on information requested 
IT2CUEC2II 3210 ×+++= ββββ UETNFO  
Dep. Variable = BINFO Dep. Variable = CINFO  Independent 
Variable β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value  
Intercept β0 –0.007 0.8184 0.114 0.0097  
IT2 β1 0.016 0.0531 –0.011 0.3221  
CUE β2 –0.012 0.7702 0.090 0.1053  
CUE×IT2 β3 0.004 0.6840 –0.018 0.2101  
      
 R2 0.0291  0.0358   
 
78 











 1 IT2 Order of question in Task 1 0.43 0.6683 
 1 IT2 Order of three questions of interest in Task 1 1.14 0.2577 
 2A RF1 Order of questions in Task 2A 1.20 0.2338 
 2A RF2 Order of questions in Task 2A 0.22 0.8256 
 2B RF3 Order of questions in Task 2B 1.12 0.2282 
 2C INFER1 Order of questions in Task 2C –1.13 0.2607 
 2C INFER2 Order of questions in Task 2C –0.72 0.4753 
a Some variables were not tested for order effects for the following reasons: (1) the variable is a 
manipulation of another variable (e.g., IT1 is a manipulation of IT2), or (2) the variable resulted from a 
response not effected by question order (e.g., CINOF, BINFO). 
b Test statistic is the t-value for the used to evaluate the significance of the parameter estimate for the 
variable used to represent order. 
 
that cannot be manipulated by the researcher. The second independent variable is client 
integrity, manipulated by the three-level variable CUE (high, medium and low).  
 As a check of this manipulation, the auditor demonstrates his/her own assessment 
of the client’s integrity, which is coded as the variable INFER1. The tests of hypotheses 1 
and 2 were repeated using INFER127 in place of the manipulated variable CUE. The 
results of these additional tests are discussed in the following sections. No retest is made 
of hypothesis 3 because it does not address client integrity as an explanatory variable. 
4.7.1. Retest of Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1 (alternative form) states that when assessing the risk of management 
fraud, internal auditors will assess the risk of fraud higher, the lower the client’s integrity. 
A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to retest hypothesis 1 (null form): 
the auditor’s assessment of client’s integrity (INFER1) has no effect on the auditor’s 
assessed risk of fraud (RF1, RF2, and RF3). The following model was used: 
 eNFERRF ++= 1I10 ββ ,  (9) 
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where RF is a vector of the three risk of fraud variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’ 
Lambda test statistic for this multivariate regression test has a value of 0.908 (F-value = 
4.380 and p-value 0.0057), which offers evidence that the model is a significant 
determinant of the three dependent variables.  
 Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to 
assess the significance of the INFER1 on the dependent variable. To support hypothesis 
1, the value of β1 should be less than zero, which would indicate that as client integrity 
goes down, the risk of fraud increases. The results of these three regressions, presented in 
Table 21, show that β1 is negative and significant in all three models. These tests offer 
strong evidence for rejecting null hypothesis 1 in favor of the alternative: the higher 
client’s integrity, the lower the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud. However, in this case, the 
hypothesis must be restated as “the higher the auditor’s assessment of client integrity, the 
lower the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud.” 
4.7.2. Retest of Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 expands the prediction about hypothesis 1 to include the auditor’s 
implicit theory of integrity and its interaction with assessment of client integrity as a 
predictor of the risk of fraud. Specifically, hypothesis 2 states that when assessing the risk 
of management fraud, internal auditors who are entity theorists of integrity will weight  
Table 21. The effect of integrity (INFER1) on assessed risk of fraud (RF) 
1INFERRF 10 ββ +=  
Dep. Variable = RF1 Dep. Variable = RF2 Dep. Variable = RF3 Independent 
Variables β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value β Estimate p-value 
Intercept β0 0.781 <0.0001 0.305 <0.0001 0.389 <0.0001 
INFER1 β1 –0.066 0.0010 –0.046 0.0404 –0.043 0.0111 
       
 R2 0.0794  0.0314  0.0478  
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the moral inferences of the client’s integrity more heavily than those who are incremental 
theorists of integrity. To retest this hypothesis, the manipulated integrity variable CUE is 
replaced with the auditor’s inference of client integrity (INFER1). 
 A multivariate multiple regression test was conducted to retest hypothesis 1 (null 
form): the interaction of the client’s integrity as assessed by the auditor (INFER1) and the 
auditor’s implicit theory (IT2) has no effect on the auditor’s assessed risk of fraud (RF1, 
RF2, and RF3). The following model was used: 
 eNFERRF +×+++= IT2INFER1IT21I 3210 ββββ ,  (10) 
where RF is a vector of the three risk of fraud variables, RF1, RF2, and RF3. The Wilks’ 
Lambda test statistic for this multivariate regression test has a value of 0.849 (F-value = 
2.40 and p-value 0.0123), indicating that the model with the interaction term is a 
significant determinate of the three risk of fraud assessments.  
 Three regression analyses, one each per dependent variable, was conducted to 
assess the significance of the interaction of INFER1 and IT2 on the dependent variables. 
Applying the implicit theory, the higher the value of IT2 (leaning more toward an entity 
theorist), the more extreme and negative the effect on risk of fraud; in other words, the 
prediction is that β3 should be less than zero. In three regressions (using the three 
measure of risk of fraud as dependent variables), β3 was not significant, offering no 
additional evidence that would support rejecting the null version of hypothesis 2. 
4.8. End Notes
 
22 Each of the six chapters had a separate lottery. The lottery prize was a gift certificate 
valued between $75 and $100 to local restaurants or online retailers. Respondents 
were informed that if a minimum number of people (based on a percentage of 
membership) responded from their chapter, a drawing would be held to award one 
certificate to one of the respondents. Of the six chapters, only one met the minimum 




23 Many companies have policies and physical controls (firewalls) against downloading 
executable files. The Excel version of the research instrument contains macros, which 
are small executable programs. The offer for a paper version was intended to give 
respondents an alternative to downloading an executable file. In addition, anonymity 
could be better preserved if the research instrument were returned in a postage-paid 
envelope rather than via email, which contains identifying information. 
24 Colbert (1989) reviews literature related to the effect of experience on auditors’ 
judgments. Though results are mixed, the general consensus of these 17 studies is that 
auditor experience is a significant factor in complex and unstructured tasks, but not 
significant in unstructured tasks. The same consensus does not apply to comparing 
students to auditors, only more-experience to less-experienced auditors. 
25 There are two implicit theory variables, IT1 and IT2. Because they use the same raw 
data to construct the dichotomous and continuous variables, the effect of 
demographics is investigated on IT2 only. 
26  The Pearson correlation coefficients change to 0.457 for INFER1 and 0.476 for 
INFER2 with the outliers omitted. 
27 INFER1 (integrity inference only) was chosen as opposed to INFER 2 (inference 
about four integrity characteristics averaged together) because the differences 
between high and low, high and medium, and medium and low were all statistically 
significant for INFER1. See section 4.2.4. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
5.1. Research Conclusions 
 The purpose of this research project was to determine how internal auditors would 
use the cues provided about their client’s integrity. One of three integrity cues was 
included in a narrative upon which the auditors based their answers to some planning 
questions. The overall conclusions are presented below. 
 The first hypothesis tested whether the integrity cue had an effect on the auditor’s 
assessment of management fraud risk. In this study, there was evidence to conclude that 
integrity affects the auditors’ mean assessment of management fraud risk. In eight tests of 
this hypothesis (one MANOVA, three ANOVA, one multivariate regression, and three 
regressions), seven of the tests offered evidence for rejecting the null of no effect. 
 The first four tests of hypothesis 1 (section 4.3.2.) examined the effect of a three-
level manipulated integrity variable on the assessed risk of fraud. These test revealed that 
the manipulation was successful in affecting the mean assessed fraud risk for two of the 
three measures of risk of fraud. However subsequent t-tests for directionality (section 
4.3.3.) showed that the expected directionality (the lower the integrity, the higher the 
fraud risk) was only observed when comparing the low-integrity level to another level. 
That is when comparing the medium-level to the high-level of integrity, the expected 
effect was not found.28 From a practical standpoint, the auditor’s assessed risk of 
management fraud averaged more than 10% higher when integrity was low as compared 
to the other integrity-levels.29  
 Hypothesis 1 was retested using the auditor’s assessed level of integrity rather 
than the cue level as the predicting variable. In the four statistical tests used for this retest, 
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the auditor’s assessed level of integrity significantly affected the assessed risk of fraud 
(all three measures). The retest of this hypothesis indicates that the integrity inferences 
made by internal auditors are used to assess the risk of management fraud. From a 
practical standpoint, the regression parameter indicates that as the auditors’ integrity 
inference increased from one (lowest client integrity) to six (highest client integrity), the 
risk of fraud droped between 21.5% and 33%.30 
 The second hypothesis tested whether the auditor’s implicit theory of integrity, a 
personal conviction, interacts with the effect of client integrity on the auditor’s assessed 
risk of fraud. The auditor’s implicit theory of integrity was modeled after Dweck and 
Leggett (1988) and was measured using three questions about a person’s ability to change 
his/her integrity characteristics. Theoretically, auditors who were scored as entity 
theorists of integrity (as opposed to incremental theorists) would use the integrity cue to 
predict future behavior. In other words, the entity theorists would expect future low-
integrity (high-integrity) behavior from a person who exhibited it in the past, while an 
incremental theorist would not have an expectation of future behavior based on past 
behavior.  
 Twelve statistical tests were used to test this hypothesis (one MANOVA, three 
ANOVAs, two multivariate regressions, and six regressions), but no evidence was found 
to support this hypothesis using the interaction of implicit theory and cue level, or during 
the retest using the interaction of implicit theory and the auditor’s assessed level of client 
integrity (see section 4.4.). Dweck and Leggett (1988) developed a general implicit 
theory that other researchers (e.g., McConnell 2001; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 
1999) have investigated as a mitigating effect on social judgments. In a sense, the 
84 
auditors’ assessment of client integrity is a social judgment, and the effects found in this 
prior research should be found in this project as well. Failure to find such results may be 
a problem with the research design or lack of statistical power (see section 5.3.). 
Alternatively, the judgment internal auditors make about client integrity may not be the 
same as a social judgment. Instead, because auditors are trained professionals, their 
judgments made about client integrity may not be biased by their personal convictions. 
 The third hypothesis tested whether the auditors’ implicit theory of integrity 
affected the amount of additional information (bonus-related or character-related) 
requested by the auditors. Theoretically, entity theorists would request more character-
related information. Using t-tests to compare the mean information requested between 
entity and incremental theorists (see section 4.5.), no strong evidence was found to 
support this hypothesis. Marginally-significant evidence (a p-value just above the 0.05 
level) was found in support of entity theorists requesting more bonus-related information; 
however, the additional amount of evidence is negligible, and offers no practical 
significance. Again, the lack of evidence may be an indication that an auditor’s training 
prevents or lessens the effects of the auditor’s personal convictions in a professional 
setting. 
5.2. Potential Contributions and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This research was ultimately inconclusive because the research hypotheses related 
to the implicit theory were not rejected in favor of the experimental null. However, 
support of the first hypothesis, which duplicated the findings of Church, McMillan, and 
Schneider (2001a and 2001b), sustains the idea that an auditor’s impression of the client’s 
integrity does have an effect on the auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk. 
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Future researchers may be interested in exploring how auditors seek out information 
about client integrity and the degree to which the nature of that evidence affects the 
auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk. 
 During the manipulation check of this project, there was no statistical difference 
found between the medium and low levels of the manipulation, but the high level of 
integrity was statistically higher than the other two. Future researchers may wish to 
investigate how different observed client activity would cause the auditor’s integrity 
inference to change. Such research could have a significant impact on guiding auditor 
training and possibly future auditing standards related to client integrity. 
 This research project is an investigation of a personal characteristic of an auditor 
and its effect on internal auditor’s assessment of management fraud risk. Though this 
study is inconclusive, researchers may wish to continue research in this area by testing 
the effects of other personal characteristics and convictions. This study introduces the 
implicit theory (Dweck and Leggett 1988) into the body of accounting research. No 
evidence is found to support a mitigating effect caused by the implicit theory of integrity, 
but the lack of evidence about the effect is in conflict with findings from other disciplines 
(e.g., Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1999 investigated the effects in a jury setting). 
Future research into why the implicit theory has an effect in some settings but not in 
accounting (or other settings) would be needed to explain this conflict.  
 Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) foundational research is based on the concept that 
prior to any observation of cues, the observer has a preformed notion about whether a 
particular trait is fixed (entity theorists) or variable (incremental theorist) within a given 
person. McConnell (2001) investigated how entity theorists and incremental theorists 
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respond to a series of integrity cues. Additional research is needed to determine whether 
Dweck and Leggett’s implicit theory is a factor that affects how observers revise their 
beliefs (as seen in Ashton and Ashton 1988 and Bamber 1983) as additional evidence is 
received. 
5.3. Potential Limitations 
 As with any research project, this study is subject to several limitations. Many of 
these limitations are related to validity, which refers to the ability of the researcher to 
measure what s/he thinks is being measured. These limitations are discussed in the 
following subsections. 
5.3.1. Lab Experiments and External Validity 
 This study is an experiment in which internal auditors are asked to use 
information provided by the researcher to make the types of decisions that auditors make 
in their everyday jobs. However, experiments are performed with a limited amount of 
information (i.e., “in a laboratory”) as opposed to unlimited information (i.e., in the 
whole world). The purpose of this researcher-imposed limitation is both practical (to limit 
the extent of the research project and the time required to participate) and to hold 
constant or eliminate as many variables as possible to more effectively study the 
variables of interest.  
 Unfortunately, the laboratory environment is much smaller than the actual world 
in which the auditor operates, so the researcher must be concerned about whether the 
auditors’ responses are the same or similar to their real-world actions. If the researcher 
cannot make that assumption, then the study is not generalizable beyond the scope of the 
experiment, which is a threat to the study’s external or ecological validity. 
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5.3.2. Subject Experience 
 The experiences of the subject prior to and during the completion of the research 
instrument may have an effect on their responses. To a certain extent, the experiences of 
the subjects are the key to drawing conclusions about how internal auditors behave. 
However, the research instruments were completed by the subjects in a variety of 
different settings over a four-month period of time.  
 Because the researcher was not in control of the local environment in which the 
instrument was completed, disruptions, distractions, and other confounding elements 
could have had an effect on the way a particular subject responded. In addition, the global 
environment (e.g., world news, seasonal) may have changed during the four-month 
period causing a larger set of information to be used by those subjects who responded 
later. There is no measure of these environmental changes included in this study; 
therefore, their effects cannot be measured. 
5.3.3. Construct Validity versus Hypothesis-Guessing 
 This study is subject to concerns about construct validity, (i.e., the extent to which 
variables capture the concept of interest). Construct validity is often a problem with 
research involving subjects because the researcher does not want to directly ask the 
question directly for fear of hypothesis-guessing. Hypothesis-guessing is the practice of 
the subjects trying to determine how the researcher wants him/her to answer. The 
Hawthorne Effect is a famous case in which workers were more productive, but the 
researchers couldn’t determine whether the improvement was due to the improved 
lighting (the variable of interest) or the presence of the researcher.  
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 Essentially, the researcher must find a balance between threats to construct 
validity and hypothesis-guessing. “The problem of hypothesis-guessing can best be 
avoided by making hypotheses hard to guess” (Cook and Campbell 1979, 66). Making 
the hypothesis hard to guess is accomplished by asking questions indirectly. In this study 
however, the questions are asked directly (e.g., the respondent is asked directly to assess 
the risk of fraud). For that reason, there is limited threat to construct validity.  
 Unfortunately, because of the directness of the questions, this study is more 
subject to hypothesis-guessing. To minimize the effects of hypothesis-guessing, most of 
the questions of interest are included with other alternatives (distracters) that may lead 
the respondents to believe that the research is about something else or about several 
things, which hopefully takes the focus off the subject of management fraud. Therefore, 
the variables, particularly the dependent variables (RF1, RF2, RF3, BINFO, and CINFO), 
should be a good proxy for their intended construct. 
5.3.4. Statistical Conclusion Validity 
 Because the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 failed to result in a rejection of the null, 
there is a question of whether the tests’ power was sufficient enough to reject the null 
hypothesis. That is, was there an effect that these tests were not powerful enough to 
detect? This question particularly applies to hypothesis 2, a 3×2 design resulting in six 
cells, which creates a need for more observations than the other tests to maintain a 
minimum level of power. The power of a study is influenced by the sample size. Using 
the tables developed by Bratcher, Moran, and Zimmer (1970) and preliminary standard 
deviation, a sample size of at least 18 observations per cell was needed to achieve a 
power of .80, but due to discarded observations, one cell contained only 17 observations.  
89 
 Collection of additional responses may increase the power and allow smaller 
effects to be detected that were not identified in this project. The tables of Bratcher, 
Moran, and Zimmer (1970) were used to decide on the original sample size. With six 
cells in the design and by setting alpha-risk at 0.05, power at 0.80, the needed sample size 
of 18 observations per cell was found by using a ratio of ∆/σ (maximum mean difference 
divided by standard deviation) of 1.25. The standard deviation was obtained from test 
data. Using the actual standard deviation of the observations,31 27 observations per cell 
would be needed to find a mean difference of approximately 0.25. 
5.4. End Notes 
 
28  The reason this expected effect was not found in hypothesis 1 may have revealed by 
the manipulation check (sections 4.3.2. and 4.3.3.), which revealed that the 
manipulated integrity variable was not completely successful in affecting the integrity 
inference formed by the subjects. 
29  The average difference of more than 10% was calculated using the two statistical test 
that were statistically significant. It was calculated as the difference between the 
mean assessed risk of fraud at the low level and the other two levels [((0.640–
0.526)+(0.640–0.531)+(0.315–0.229)+(0.315–0.203))÷4= 0.105].  
30  The change in risk of fraud was calculated by multiplying the parameter estimate by 
the difference between the low and high integrity inference (6–1=5): 
• For RF1, the feasibility of fraud as an explanation for change in analytic,  
–0.066×5= –0.33 gap in risk of fraud between low and high integrity inference; 
• For RF2, the feasibility of fraud by Conaway as opposed to other members of 
management, –0.046×5= –0.23 gap; and  
• For RF3, the probability of fraud as an explanation for change in analytic, 
–0.043×5= –0.215 gap. 
31  The standard deviations of the three dependent variables used in hypothesis 2 are 
0.240 for RF1, 0.271 for RF2, and 0.205 for RF3. 
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APPENDIX A: PAPER RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 The eight-page research instrument (paper version) is presented in this appendix. 
The instrument was printed on ledger paper (11”×17”) and folded to create a four-page 
booklet printed on fronts and backs. The layout of facing pages is shown in Figure 11 
below and the actual content of the pages is presented on the following eight pages. 
 For three reasons, the research instrument completed by respondents may be 
different from the one presented in this appendix: (1) there are three versions related to 
the experimental manipulation of the variable CUE; (2) some versions were electronic 
instead of paper; and (3) the order of questions was randomized. These three variations 
are discussed in detail in Appendix B. In the version presented here, the questions are 
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 INTERNAL AUDIT 
 PLANNING DECISIONS 











The goal of this dissertation project is to develop an understanding of how an internal auditor's 
planning judgments and decisions can impact the outcome of an audit. Because you practice 
internal auditing, your expertise is a necessary element for furthering the understanding of how 
audits are conducted, which may be helpful in standard setting and to improve training and 
practice. 
  
The responses from this questionnaire will be presented in summary form only. You are not 
required to provide your name or other identifying information on this questionnaire. If you wish, 
you may request the results of this study by emailing swatson@lsu.edu. 
  
After reading and agreeing to the consent infromatino below, you will be walked through six 
tasks (1, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, and 3) in which your opinions and professional judgment should 





By completing this questionnaire, you have agreed to participate in research regarding internal 
audit planning decisions. This research project has been approved by the Louisiana State 
University Human Subjects Committee. Before continuing on to the questionnaire, it is important 
for you to understand the following: 
  
1.The procedure only involves completing a questionnaire. 
 
2.You will not face any significant discomforts or stresses. There is no risk to participating. 
 
3.The results of your participation are confidential and will not be released in any 
individually identifiable form. Questionnaire contains no identifying information. 
 
4.The investigator, Stephanie Watson, will answer any further question about the research if 
you wish (see contact information below). 
  
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary, and you may choose not to participate 
by not returning a completed questionnaire. Your questionnaire will not contain any identifying 
information that will link your responses to you; therefore, once your questionnaire has been 
returned, it cannot be removed from the study at your request. To preserve anonymity, you do not 
need to sign and return this consent form.  
  
STEPHANIE F. WATSON 
Doctoral Candidate 
LSU Department of Accounting  
3101 CEBA 
Baton Rouge LA 70803 





SECTION 1: CONTROL OVER OUTCOMES 
 
TASK 1:       
Ten statements are presented below regarding the control people have over outcomes in their lives. Indicate 
the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the ten statements by marking the appropriate 
circle. 
 
1. A person’s integrity is something very 

































2. Whether a person is honest and candid or 
not is deeply ingrained in his/her 
































3. There is not much that can be done to 
change a person’s integrity traits such as 
whether s/he is self-serving or law-abiding 
































4. If a person sets realistic goals, s/he can 
































5. Professional success is mostly a result of 
social and economic backgrounds, which 
diminish a person’s ability to affect his/her 
































6. How a person behaves is a changeable 
characteristic; behavior patterns can be 
































7. Without timing, hard work is useless; 
being at the right place at the right time is 
































8. A person gets promoted because the boss 
likes him/her personally, not because of 
































9. Chance has nothing to do with being 
successful; a person is in control of the 
































10. Whatever plans a person makes, there is 
always something that will interfere with 



































SECTION 2: INTERNAL AUDIT NARRATIVE AND TASKS 
 
You are an internal auditor for TransportNation, Inc., a transportation company with several divisions 
including charter airlines, taxi services, and a national fleet of moving vans. You have recently been 
assigned to the team that will audit maintenance expenses for the Chess Cab division of TransportNation. 
This audit is still in the planning stage. An excerpt from the planning memorandum is provided below, 
which you should read before proceeding to the tasks in this section. You may refer back to this 
memorandum while completing the tasks. 
 
Audit Planning Memorandum (excerpt) 
TransportNation, Inc. 
 
Per our master audit plan, maintenance expenses of Chess Cab are audited on an annual basis, 
budgeting more audit effort in even-numbered years. Therefore, the 2002 audit of these 
expenses has budgeted 128 audit hours (two auditors for eight days) to conduct the audit, which 




The key employees that should be interviewed are Terry Alexander, CEO of TransportNation, 
Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, and Shawn Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor. 
 
Maintenance Expenses 
During the course of this audit, pay 
careful attention to the recent reduction 
of maintenance expenses as depicted in 
the figure to the right. In April 2000, Terry 
Alexander replaced the director of Chess 
Cab with the specific directive to reduce 
these costs. As incentive, the new 
director’s bonus in the first five years is 
tied to a reduction of these costs. 
Maintenance Expenses Relative to 
Sales


















Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, was hired in April 2000 and was first involved in an audit 
of maintenance and insurance expenses in July 2000. During the first audit, Conaway was 
cooperative and enthusiastic about effecting changes suggested by the internal auditors. 
However, the audit team in 2001 found Conaway distant and detached from the audit process. 
During a walk-through of the garage, Shawn Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor, said that Conaway 
was distressed about some charitable work. Further investigation revealed that Conaway had 
been asked to resign from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because 
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising drives and meetings and 
because Conaway intentionally misled contributors about the number of children's beds that 





TASK 2A: FEASIBILITY OF EXPLANATIONS 
In the planning memo excerpt you read, Chess Cab’s maintenance expenses to sales ratio is decreasing. 
Using your professional judgment, respond to the following seven questions regarding the feasibility of 
explanations for this decrease. Indicate your response by marking one circle; the farther you mark to the 
right, the more feasible you believe the explanation to be. 
  
1. How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of 
fraudulent activities on the part of Chris Conaway? 
  
 
 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
2. How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales was the result of 
fraudulent activities on the part of Terry Alexander? 
  
 
 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
3. How feasible is it that Chris Conaway implemented new policies and procedures that led to the decrease 
in maintenance expenses relative to sales? 
  
 
 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
4. How feasible is it that Terry Alexander or another member of TransportNation’s corporate management 




 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
5. How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales is the result of an 
unintentional misstatement in Chess Cab’s accounting records? 
  
 
 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
6. How feasible is it that the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales is the result of an 
unintentional misstatement in TransportNation’s accounting records? 
  
 
 0% Feasibility 100% 
  
7. How feasible is it that factors in the external environment—those beyond the control of management—
led to the decrease in maintenance expenses relative to sales? 
  
 




TASK 2B: LIKELIHOOD OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
In the narrative you read, Chess Cab’s maintenance expenses to sales ratio is decreasing. The change could 
be driven by either a single or a combination of four factors: 
 
(1) Intentional Manipulation such as vandalism, theft, and deceit. 
(2) Internal Environment such as procedures and policies. 
(3) External Environment such as weather, declining economy, and war. 
(4) Misstatement such as unintentional error, transposed numbers, and misinterpretation. 
 
Factor Points 
Intentional Manipulation  
Internal Environment  
External Environment  
Misstatement  
In the table to the right, indicate the likelihood that the 
reduction in maintenance expenses relative to sales happened 
as a result of these four explanatory factors by distributing 
100 points among the four factors. The largest number of 
points assigned to a factor will indicate that the factor is the 
most likely cause of the decrease. When the total equals 100, 





TASK 2C: PERSONAL QUALITIES 
Six statements are presented below regarding the personal characteristics of Chris Conaway, Director of 
Chess Cabs. Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the ten statements by marking 
the appropriate circle. 
 



































































































































































































TASK 2D: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
As an internal auditor, you gather the information you need to plan the audit. In the spaces below, list up to 
six additional pieces of information (not provided in the planning materials) that you would like to have 
before finalizing the maintenance expense audit program for Chess Cab. Your response may be in the form 











SECTION 3: INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
 
TASK 3 
Please provide some information about yourself. All data collected in this research project are confidential. 
The results of this study will be presented in summary form; no individual information will be reported.  
  
1. Do you hold any professional certifications? Mark all that apply: 
 
 CIA  CFE  CMA  Other, specify ____________________________________ 
CPA  CFA  CISA  I do not hold a professional certification. 
 
  










4. How many years of experience do you have in auditing? 
 
 _______ years _______ months 
 
  
5. For what portion of your experience as an auditor were you an internal auditor?  
 
 _______ years _______ months 
 
  
6. About how long did it take you to complete this questionnaire? 
 
 _______ minutes 
 
  
7. What is your level of experience with the audit of expenses (not necessarily vehicle maintenance 




 Low Experience High 
  













Place your completed questionnaire in the postage-paid reply envelope and drop it in the mail. 
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT VARIATIONS 
 There are multiple versions of the research instrument presented in Appendix A 
that result from three types of variations: (1) there are three versions related to the 
experimental manipulation of the variable CUE; (2) some versions were electronic 
instead of paper; and (3) the order of questions was randomized. 
B.1. Experimental Manipulation Variations 
 The narrative presented in the research instrument contains an integrity cue under 
the heading “Client Relationships.” There are three levels of integrity in this study, and 
each respondent’s version contained only one level. The variations in the text used to 
represent this cue are presented in Table 22. Each cue contained the lead-in shown in 
panel A, but depending on the level of the manipulated variable, the final statements 
(integrity cue) were different. 
B.2. Electronic Research Instruments 
 Many of the responses obtained for this research project were collected using 
electronic research instruments and email rather than mailing and returning a tradition 
paper instrument shown in Appendix A. The electronic instrument was created in 
Microsoft Excel and contained macros and buttons that emulate reading through the 
actual eight-page paper instrument. Notable differences are discussed below. 
 First, the responses in the electronic instrument are made by clicking and typing 
as opposed to writing. Second, the ability of the respondent to return to a task (i.e., 
change answers in a completed task) is removed in the electronic instrument. However, 
the respondents can return to the narrative in both the paper and electronic instruments.  
 
104 
Table 22. Narrative versions 
Panel A: Lead-in to integrity cue 
 Chris Conaway, Director of Chess Cab, was hired in April 2000 and 
was first involved in an audit of maintenance and insurance expenses in 
July 2000. During the first audit, Conaway was cooperative and 
enthusiastic about effecting changes suggested by the internal auditors. 
However, the audit team in 2001 found Conaway distant and detached 
from the audit process. During a walk-through of the garage, Shawn 
Whealor, Mechanic Supervisor, said that Conaway was distressed about 
some charitable work. 
 
Panel B: Manipulated integrity cue 
CUE Narrative text 
Low 
Integrity 
Further investigation revealed that Conaway had been asked to resign 
from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because 
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising 
drives and meetings and because Conaway intentionally misled 
contributors about the number of children's beds that were available in 
an effort to boost contributions. 
Medium 
Integrity 
Further investigation revealed that Conaway had been asked to resign 
from the DiPalma Children’s Home Fund-Raising Committee because 
Conaway was often late to or didn't show up at all for fund-raising 
drives and meetings. 
High 
Integrity 
Further investigation revealed that Conaway lost a large contributor to 
the DiPalma Children’s Home when the contributor asked what 
percentage of the funds raised went to overhead and Conaway told him 
the truth. 
 
Finally, there were 12 pages in the electronic instruments as opposed to eight in the paper 
instruments. Table 23 describes the mapping between the pages of the two instrument 
media.  
B.3. Randomization of Question Order 
 In an attempt to avoid the effects that order of questions might have on responses, 
the questions in each task were randomized. In the electronic instruments, the macros that 
controlled movement from page to page also randomized the questions for each  
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1. Cover 1. Cover Figure 12 
2. Instructions Figure 13 
3. Consent  Figure 14 
2. Instructions, Consent,  
and Researcher Contact a 
4. Researcher Contact Figure 15 
3. Section 1: Task 1 5. Section 1: Task 1 Figure 16 
4. Section 2: Narrative 6. Section 2: Narrative Figure 17 
5. Section 2: Task 2A 7. Section 2: Task 2A Figure 18 
8. Section 2: Task 2B Figure 19 6. Section 2:  
Task 2B and Task 2C b 9. Section 2: Task 2C Figure 20 
7. Section 2: Task 2D 10. Section 2: Task 2D Figure 21 
11. Section 3: Task 3 Figure 22 8. Section 3: Task 3 
and Return Instructions c 12. Return Instructions Figure 23 
a The instructions, consent, and researcher contact information were split into three pages in the 
electronic version. The first two were separated to ensure that the researcher gave consent separate from 
understanding the instructions. The respondents could view the researcher contact information at any 
time during completion of the survey while other pages were hidden as the respondent completed 
reading them. 
b Tasks 2B and 2C are physically short and were presented on one page on the paper instrument, but were 
separated on the electronic instrument. 
c Return instructions for the instrument were printed in a box at the bottom of the last page of the paper 
instrument which contained Task 3. In the electronic version, after Task 3 is completed, the return 
instructions are presented on a separate page. 
 
respondent. On the paper instruments, an attempt was made to construct each instrument 
separately so questions could be presented in random order. However, some instruments 
and tasks were photocopied resulting in some respondents receiving the same order of 
questions. Therefore, the effect of the order of questions on responses was examined, and 
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